Somehow*, I came across Paul Lee’s post on high valuations, he’s a founding member and Senior Vice President at the Peacock Equity Fund, a joint venture between NBC Universal and GE Capital:
A high valuation is problematic for a number of reasons. The first, and probably most important, is the impact on the company’s ability to attract quality talent. That’s not to say that you couldn’t (I’m sure the aforementioned microblogging site is seeing a flood of resumes). However, most people in the startup world join startups for the equity upside in a liquidity event or IPO (although the garage sale furniture and stale pizza at 1 a.m. is tremendously appealing). When a highly priced round is completed, guess what–the strike price of the options also go up. In effect, the hurdle for the options to be “in the money” has gone up and the value of the options has decreased. The motivation for the employees coming in after the financing has been materially altered.
Another difficulty in raising a highly priced round is the set of expectations from the new investors. Given the high valuations, the milestones that you’d have to hit to justify the valuation are usually aggressive. The difficulty in setting such aggressive milestones is that if you only complete 50%, you’ve basically built a bridge to nowhere. When you next need to raise capital, you may be faced with a down round, or in extreme circumstances, a complete recap or non-funding. Lawsuits and tensions around the board about fiduciary responsibilities are common. Not very fun stuff.
It sort of reminds me of a quote from a low-profile entrepreneur named Bill Gates who started a software company in Seattle back in the day. He quit to run a non-profit to help end poverty:
One challenge Microsoft did face, and that Netscape now faces, is coping with a high market valuation. Netscape has little income, but investors have valued its stock at more than $2 billion. When a company’s shares have a high value, expectations from investors, including employee-owners, are correspondingly high. Failure to meet those expectations can be damaging. If you’re giving share options to employees so that they can participate financially in the expected success of a company, a high valuation hurts. If the market’s already anticipated the great work those people are going to do, then their stock options won’t appreciate much in value, if at all. This can make the options worthless. Many times in the past I have felt that Microsoft stock was higher in value than it should be. Subsequently I was proven, in a sense, to be wrong. Controlling expectations—whether about deliveries, product features or stock value—is often wise in a technology business. It’s a lot better to under-promise and over-deliver.
Read more about that here.
[* A lie. You will see why and how I was on Fast Company in a few days when I post the Fast Company article that mentions WatchMojo.]
Could it happen? Sure, why not. Markets are looking for a catalyst and if any media company could IPO these days, NBC Universal could be it. See the interview with John Battelle here:
Some time ago, online media professional Dave Haber (and reader of this blog) emailed me an article from MediaPost, titled “How Can Independent Video Producers Compete In The Super-Premium Era?”
The article was written by Lewis Rothkopf, who is vice president of network development at BrightRoll, one of the pre-roll networks out there. As a side note, I really admire Brightroll’s CEO Tod Sacerdoti. Unlike most of the pre-roll intermediaries who seem to be either in denial or out of touch about that the pre-roll format, Sacerdoti is realistic about the pros and cons of the format, not insulting people’s intelligence about why his firm focuses on the unit.
Anyway, for some time, I was considering writing a related piece on indeed how independent video producers (such as WatchMojo.com, the company where I am the CEO) can compete in the super-premium era. It was the first time I’d seen someone else use those terms, because for some time, we’ve separated “premium content” (what new media producers like WatchMojo.com produce) from “super premium content” (what TV networks and film studios create).
Rothkop’s three tips included:
1) Compete on quality.
2) Compete on price.
3) Compete on advertiser-friendliness.
As proud as I am about WatchMojo.com’s content, I don’t think that economics permit premium content quality to surpass that of super premium. It won’t happen. After all, with text content, a kid in a basement can pass off for a Pulitzer-prize winning journalist. In video, that is pretty darn hard.
So while his ideas are good, I would add that you should also compete on:
4) Rights: giving partnerships the opportunity to go global and multi-platform
5) Frequency: the drawback with traditional media is that it does not really update as frequently as online consumers of media (be it listeners, viewers, readers) are grown accustom to.
I could list a few other things, but the purpose here is not to give away too much of our secret sauce.
The purpose of this article, in fact, is to look at how traditional media companies can avoid the music industry’s fate by understanding how new media companies fit in their strategies and ecosystem.
Tenet 1: The Web Shrinks Traditional Media
Due to the economic meltdown and subseqent slowdown in advertising, a lot of cable companies are regretting putting their shows online for free.
It’s not just the cable companies, though. From Michael Lynton, the CEO of Sony Pictures, via HuffPost:
I actually welcome the Sturm und Drang I’ve stirred, because it gives me an opportunity to make a larger point (one which I also made during that panel discussion, though it was not nearly as viral as the sentence above). And my point is this: the major content businesses of the world and the most talented creators of that content — music, newspapers, movies and books — have all been seriously harmed by the Internet.
Is that true? I think the Web shrinks the traditional media business (producers of super premium content) by giving an enormous opportunity for new media creators like WatchMojo.com (producers of premium content) to disrupt things.
Tenet 2: Amongst Traditional Media, With Online Video: Those Who Can, Won’t. Those Who Want, Can’t
As I’ve long argued: online video can be a salvation to print media, at least they should care about online video. The problem is that print media lacks the DNA - be it in terms of asset or people - whereas TV-centric media firms have the DNA but lack the financial incentive.
Either way for traditional media, it does not look good. Those who can, won’t; those who want, can’t.
Tenet 3: Super Premium Content vs. Premium Content
On the traditional media video company side of things, you have companies who slant towards scripted entertainment, news and sports (CBS, ABC, NBC and FOX) and then the non-fiction ones, such as Discovery Communications, Liberty Media (who owns the Travel Channel), Scripps.
The advertising budgets in television are massive. As such, these companies spend what it takes to produce “super premium content”.
Memo to New Media Guys: Know Your Role
I don’t think new media producers have the budget or financial incentive to create super premium content. Startups who raise tons of venture capital money to do so end up making mistakes because they borrow traditional media’s inefficient and wasteful ways and burn a lot of money early on, before the web video market (be it in the form of ads or subscriptions) materializes.
This is why, I think, you have seen companies like Mania TV shut down. I am not saying they were producing “super premium” content but by attacking the music category, they ended up adopting traditional media’s bad habits.
At WatchMojo.com, we made a counter-intuitive decision to avoid focusing on one niche and produce content across the main verticals: Automotive, Business, Education, Fashion, Film, Food, Health, Music, Politics & Economy, Space, Sports, Technology, Travel, Video Game categories. A lot of accomplished people thought I was crazy to do so, but we are one of the few media companies (traditional of new media) that gets guaranteed, recurring licensing fees. Judging by our revenue breakdown, the bet paid off:
The proof is in the pudding: our content is of high enough quality to merit getting licensing fees, but in the really grand scheme of things, I am not delusional: I don’t pretend that our travel content is going to trump The Travel Channel’s, or that our Science videos will put the Discovery Channel on the brink of collapse, or that our cooking videos will put the kybosh on the Food Network.
Of course, that is not the point. Right now, our content beats 99.9% of the content out there, and the 0.1% that traditional media’s super premium content represents is still only being tested online. I think Discovery’s CEO David Zaslav is 100% right to say:
“I’ve spent a lot of time looking at the economics. If you take out a pen and you add it up, there’s not a lot of economics there [of putting full shows online]. The business model is not that strong…we get substantial value by distributing our content on dual-revenue-stream platforms, domestically and around the world. We’ve been able to take the best of our content and use pieces of it through HowStuffWorks.com or on our other sites..there’s no reason for us to take a fire hose and take a fantastically valuable library and make it available on the Web for free.”
He’s right. The web right now, and potentially never (yes, I am saying never), will grow large enough to become bigger than TV is today. However, I think that TV will shrink enough and online will grow enough for the Web to surpass everything else.
I’ve compiled the experts’ projections and ran the numbers myself, it is highly possible that online video advertising will surpass search ads by 2018 as online ads altogether take over television advertisings by 2021.
Tenet 4: Is The Objective Not Maximizing Value?
If and when that happens, the television business will have shrank by so much and online video companies will have grown so much that the disparity in market value could very well be in the favor of new media players.
Right now, it is a given that Netflix is worth more than Blockbuster. Netflix is worth $2.25 billion; Blockbuster all of $135 million. That’s right. But ten years ago, that seemed impossible and 13 years ago, Netflix didn’t even exist.
Mind you: in 2008, Blockbuster lost $375 million on revenues of $5 billion; Netflix earned $83 million on revenues of $1.3 billion. Ultimately, it’s about each company’s prospects.
Don’t get me wrong, in 10 years, traditional media companies like Walt Disney (parent of ABC and ESPN), CBS, GE’s NBC unit and News Corp.’s FOX division might make more money each year than any new media outfit, but mark my words, some of the new media outfits involved in the production and distribution of premium content (such as our own WatchMojo.com, but also the Revision3’s and Next New Networks and countless others who get less coverage) will be worth more than some of those venerable traditional media brands.
I know, I sound crazy now, delusional. But you judge for yourself:
In all likelihood, there will be an enormous amount of consolidation and an outfit that amalgamates the pieces will be worth a lot. If the traditional media guys get it right, they will outright buy everything in sight now, and leave them alone for a while.
I respect the hell out of the CBS brass, but while they made a prescient bet on acquiring Wallstrip, they dropped the ball in the market meltdown of 2008 by rushing to shut it down. Again, this is not about CBS or Wallstrip per se, it is about the interaction between traditional media and new media content companies as one market shrinks rapidly and the other balloons faster than anything else.
Tenet 5: Actually, TV Can Avoid the Fate of the Music Industry
I came across this graph by Magna Insights via the GrowYourBusiness blog. If we were to extrapolate it to the video business (all filmed entertainment, be it theatrical releases, home entertainment, or television programming), you’d think that television is as doomed as music, but it need not be that way.
Regular readers know that I don’t think anything will “kill” television outright, but this graph does suggest that online video will shrink traditional video, as was the case in music. There is a rationale to support this argument:- if the traditional media companies don’t legally make their content available online, then there is the threat of piracy. Think of music labels.
- if they do publish their content online, then they shrink their businesses via the threat of cannibalization. This is what happened to print companies, the more aggressive ones actually shrunk much quicker than those who weren’t very aggressive (think NYTimes, or the Chronicle).
But, I think it doesn’t have to be this way.
Here’s my thinking:
Music is one-dimensional in every sense of the word: it’s just audio, meaning that despite what the crack-smoking analysts seem to think, advertising-supported music is dead on arrival. For music to generate revenue online, it would require subscriptions, and consumers don’t want to pay. Media companies might pay record labels for the right to distribute music, but record labels want such massive fees that this becomes killer, too. So ultimately, because of music’s limited scope, there is really no viable business model to support it.
This is why music is increasingly seen as promotional fodder to drive merchandising, ticket sales, etc. The artists get it, the labels are adapting to it.
Video content is different. Ad-supported economic models won’t replace offline revenue streams, but they can grow to become material over time. Of course, this isn’t enough to offset the losses in traditional revenue streams, I get it, but in music, the independent artists that used the Web to promote themselves did not generate any revenue for traditional record labels per se, however, in video, new artists can represent new revenue streams for traditional TV and film companies. As such, to illustrate the point, in addition to digital sales off traditional libraries (represented by the purple), there would be additional incremental revenues from new media studios (represented by the green), as I’ve tried to demonstrate in the make-shift graph below:
But the same way that music has become promotional for other, related activities (merchandising, ticket sales), I would argue that if traditional media companies use the promotional card righ, they can actually stop the pace that traditional television is shrinking. Notice I didn’t say reverse it. I don’t think anything will reverse it, but with the web, they can optimize their inefficient production processes:
- You know what will be a hit and won’t be a hit without having to burn tens of millions of dollars in production fees.
- You can advertise your television and theatrical releases online, which is cheaper than offline media.
- etc.
The point is, even if revenues get clipped, costs should fall too. If this is managed right, then the traditional media companies’ can technically preserve their profit margins.
I think it is sheer lunacy to take a $1M production made for TV - where the economics are sound - and put that online and get nothing. But using the examples I outlined above, since audiences are increasingly online, I think there’s an argument to be made for:
- the Travel Channel to partner with us on our travel content;
- for Discovery Channel to partner with us on our science content;
- for the Food Network to partner with us on our food content;
- etc.
Tenet 6: Gobble, or be Gobbled
Eventually, though, I think traditional media companies can use new media companies for much more than just promotional vehicles. In fact, they can use the CBS/Wallstrip example and outright acquire new media ventures and commercialize the new media library while protecting the core value of their offline stuff, which can be showcased online, but not in its entirety.
Does this open the door for some piracy? Sure. But Wolverine was pirated but in the end, it probably helped augment buzz for the movie.
CBS is working now with EQAL, for example. Eventually it might outright buy them. It might not, of course.
Tenet 7: It’s All About the Multiples
Ultimately though, as the traditional media companies become more digital, via
a) the acquisition of new media companies
b) the digitization of some of their traditional assets
c) the convergence between shrinking offline revenues and growing digital revenues
their price-to-sales and price-to-earnings multiples will grow… meaning that the companies can remain very valuable, avoiding Blockbuster’s fate.
Tenet 8: Print Shall Strike Back
Of course, because print media companies lack the DNA to dive fully into video, and because online video is purely incremental, I suspect a lot of the print companies (both newspapers and magazine ones) will put the new media video companies in play on the M&A front.
It is possible that the current wave of managers in print still likes to stay within their comfort zone (behind a typewriter/computer) and not behind a camera, but the economic argument over time will be too great to overlook. To clarify on this point, it is not that I suggest that in 2009, online video revenue can make up for print loss of revenue. Rather, I suggest that print revenue will do dry up in the next decade and online video will so grow that these two will converge, and unlike for TV companies, this revenue will be incremental.
Tenet 9: The Reality Remains the Same, Though
But despite all of this, the reality remains the same: old media is fundamentally inefficient in today’s digital and connected world. Perhaps the carnage of the past 6 months has forced traditional media companies to cut back, but many have not. The NYTimes has a staggeringly large newsroom, its relevance and survival is at risk by leaner new media outfits.
Tenet 10: History Repeats Itself
A decade ago, a lot of savvy media folks didn’t quite recognize the full extent of online media’s risk to print. Today, the writing is on the wall.
Ultimately, if television wants to avoid the fate of music labels, then maybe it can dive in to the history of newspapers.
The techies still don’t get it (here, here, here, etc.): a better mousetrap (platform, box set, device etc.) is irrelevant, it all comes down to content, content and content.
It’s that simple. Figuratively speaking: Hulu is nothing without the content. Boxee is nothing without the content. Conceptually speaking, they’re great mouse traps, potentially a step in the right direction and a better mouse trap than the previous ones, but they are a means to an end.
2009 is about flight to quality; while distribution has become both fragmented and commoditized.
Content is king. Get ready to hear this adage again, the signal is getting louder folks and the noise (UGC) fizzles.
What, on earth, has happened to the media companies’ stocks and market caps?
In early summer 2007, we looked at media companies to determine who was the king of digital media and then used the multiples and figures from each of the publicly traded companies to forecast the value of NBC…
Yesterday Marketwatch ran a piece on how much media stocks have fallen off their highs. You can’t blame them for not trying, though.
I decided to compare values to see what has happened in the past 18 months and folks, it’s a disaster:
According to eMarketer, the size of online advertising revenue is $1.35B in 2008.
Since launching WatchMojo.com in 2006, I’ve had some questions about that figure… so here goes:
Definition of Online Advertising Revenue is Unclear
I’d be interested to know what falls into the category: if it’s only video pre-rolls, post-rolls or mid-rolls, then we leave out companion display ads… which on a site like YouTube account for the vast majority of revenue. Moreover, accounting departments need to standardize this definition. Conclusion on this item, we need transparency and clarity in Accounting definitions and guidelines, I’d be curious to see if an eMarketer spokesperson can address this.
Rich Media vs. Video Ads
When I was running sales for a mid-sized publisher, I recall that rich media ads (Unicast, Eyeblaster, Eyewonder, etc.) were bundled in with video ads because many rich media ads contained video… is this still true? I am not sure. Why?
Because…
In-banner vs. In-stream
Video ads can be in-stream or in-banner. In the latter case, it would be a video ad in a 300×250 that is rich media, YHOO has loads of these; then there are in-stream video ads, which go before, during or after video content. MSNBC has oodles of these. This is a very important nuance.
Double counting for partnerships?
Say FOX Sports has a partnership with MSN, who books that revenue? This kind of stuff is fairly standard, think of all ad repping firms who collect and remit ad revenue… but in MSN’s case, for example, it also has a partnership with NBC Universal on MSNBC.com. It’s somewhat useful to know how that is all booked. Is it case by case or is there an accounting rule that is actually respected industry-wide?
Ad Networks
Say an ad network such as Tremor Media, Brightroll, Video Egg, Broadband Enterprises etc. place some of these ads, they need to be accounted somewhere. The questions is: where are they accounted? My take is that like it was with display ads’ networks, video networks will touch 15% of the video pie.
Here’s our breakdown:
Using the figure from eMarketer for total US online video advertising revenues at $1.35B, up from $750M in 2007, as a benchmark.
- Yahoo.com = $200M
Yahoo did over $7B in total sales… with over $5B coming from ad revenues. Yahoo! has a lot of video content along with plenty of rich media on its site. As the world’s largest property, I could easily see Yahoo! doing even $250M in video-derived ad revenue, but when you consider that video accounts for less than 5% of the online video advertising pie, then we will assign a 4% share to online video for Yahoo! total ad revenues.
- Viacom = $125M
I think Viacom generates a larger than normal share of its online advertising revenues from online video ads. Last year I noticed MTV.com running a good dosage of video ads when my wife was watching The Hills on their site (I swear she was watching it). I also think that between Nick.com, MTV.com, NeoPets.com, iFilm/Spike, Atom.com and Comedy Central.com, one reason why Viacom is making a big deal about piracy on YouTube is that it sees just how good the online video advertising business can be.
- AOL Time Warner = $120M
Time Warner’s sources of revenue from online video includes AOL.com, TMZ.com, CNN.com, Time.com and many other prominent places. In fact, while TW does have the cable assets, if AOL TWX had more video assets, I think it could generate $200M per year from video, easily.
- News Corp./Fox Interactive Media = $100M
This is seemingly bullish, but note a few things:
Fox Interactive Media did $900M in total revenues… with MySpace.com doing $750M alone. Of that, it’s worth noting that MySpace is #2 behind YouTube, with MySpace TV making a push to get lots of premium content… leveraging News Corp.’s sales team, to boot.
Moreover, between AmericanIdol.com and IGN Entertainment (which includes IGN.com, GameSpy.com, RottenTomatoes and my old stomping grounds AskMen.com), this is actually quite feasible.
(disclosure: WatchMojo.com is a content partner to MySpace TV)
- NBC Universal = $100M
When it is not hosting the Olympics, literally, I think NBC Universal does about $75M from online video, when you consider that NBC’s online portfolio includes its namesake assets including NBC.com, MSNBC.com and the recently launched NBCSports.com. However, bear in mind, NBC also owns iVillage and Healthology, both sites that use a decent amount of video, and thus, generate online video ads. I think one reason why eMarketer pumped up its estimate to $1.35B is precisely because of the Summer Games in Beijing, which should generate loads of revenues for NBC and parent GE, I would put the 2008 take to $100M.
- MSN.com = $100M
Depending on the accounting, MSN.com can be making anywhere from $100-250M… but seeing how NBC and Microsoft remain 50-50 partners in MSNBC.com, but Microsoft has reduced its stake in the television network to 18%, I suspect most of the accounting revenue falls to NBC, who then remits a cut to Microsoft’s MSN unit (I could be wrong on this). Anyway, between MSN.com and MSN’s video assets, I think MSN does $100M in annual revenues from video advertising.
- Disney = $100M.
Disney consists of ESPN.com, Disney.com and ABC.com. That is a lot of video inventory.
Moreover, Disney is actually quite the king of online media. Well, at least it was, before News Corp. and CBS spent $2B in 2 years to accelerate their efforts. But the bulk of Disney’s $1B+ digital sales come from ticket sales at its themed parks, as well as merchandising… however, you know online advertising figures prominently, and video advertising growing quickly.
I had done an analysis previously, with Disney’s range coming in at a monthly low of $1M to a high of $7M.
Is it right? Who knows… Do I look like Nostradamus? Unless you have a better idea, let’s assume the math makes sense… however, given a few factors, I now put Disney on the higher range, and give them an annual revenue from video advertising of $100M.
- Hulu = $75M
Using AlleyInsider’s range of $45-90M in revenues, we’ll peg Hulu’s revenues at $75M this year in revenues. Hulu is now a top 10 video site, according to both Nielsen and comScore.
Disclosure: Hulu is a distribution partner of WatchMojo.com, as well.
- Google/YouTube = $65M
The bulk of that $200M comes from display banners. The only part I would attribute to “video advertising” is the sum of revenues from promotional/commercial videos that YouTube runs off its main page. At an run rate of $65M per annum, that is $175,000 per day, times 365 days. It comes from Forbes’ analysis. I should state, all the way back in 2006, one month before Google bought YouTube, I said “YouTube should be making $15M per month, or $180M per annum”. No comment. Disclosure: WatchMojo.com is a content partner to YouTube.
- CBS = $60M
CBS made $24M from March Madness… mainly from banners etc., but some videos, too. And CBS has been growing very rapidly, of late, launching its syndication network. I am not sure if CBS was doing much more than $5M per month on video ads because its reach was largely on third party sites that consisted of the Syndication Network, and let’s face it, once you embed ads, no one embeds your content on third party sites…
So if CBS was doing more than $60M in online video advertising in 2008, then more props to Quincy Smith and his team.
CBS only recently cracked the Top 10 list of largest web properties, thanks to its acquisition of CNET, which takes us to:
- CNET = $40M
CNET probably does $40M in video advertising, which out of a revenue of $400M is 10% of its total. Considering that on your average site online video accounts for less than 5% but CNET was an early mover here, I think that sounds about right… and yes, I am guessing here.
- The clones (Metacafe, DailyMotion, Veoh, Break.com, Joost, etc.): $50M
I use the term clone affectionately, but I suspect that combining all of the players looking at becoming #3 in the online video distribution space would give you a figure north of $25M but less than $50M. Why? Too much UGC content holds them back…
To really avoid double counting, I am omitting all video networks, such as Brightroll, Yume, Tremor, Broadband, etc.
- Rest of Web: $220M
Doing the math means that the rest of the Web is fighting for just under a quarter of a billion dollars.
What do you think? Does this breakdown make sense? Who are we missing?
Hmm. Two and a half yars ago when I started WatchMojo.com, media companies didn’t bother replying to our overtures… looking down at us. When I say media companies: read all of them, but put a particular emphasis on print and TV companies.
Pretty quickly,
- print companies looked at us as potential lifelines, because they looked at online video as a brave new world that could save their dying print franchises (I could insert a hyperlink for each word in that sentence).
- TV companies began to feel the way print and music media firms did in the late 1990s-early 2000s.
Today, in our private talks, they “admire our vision” and “respect our foresight”. Translation: their businesses are about to join print, music and radio in the toilets.
More from our vault:
- Understanding TV executives Angst and Envy
- Web Video Represents $150B market cap in 2011, but not for TV companies
- Digital Revenues are Never Incremental for Old Media
- Will TV companies face same fate at Print Companies?
- If You’re Old Media, What Would You Do?
Reading that NBC will restrict coverage of the Olympics to NBC properties, I wonder if this will cause a rift between News Corp. and NBC.
The two companies are 50-50 joint venture partners in Hulu. In all likelihood: Hulu will want access to the coverage (which NBC is only making available after it has been aired on TV, and only making it accessible on NBCOlympics.com), but while NBC and News Corp. became bosom buddies to confront and answer the YouTube threat… over time, let’s face it, media companies have a tendency to stab one another in the back. I’ve always said that YouTube and Hulu are not really competitors and Hulu’s main obstacle from success will be NBC and News Corp.
If you think about it, the News Corp. side of Hulu’s lineage will be pushing NBC to make the Olympic Games available on Hulu asap whereas the brass at NBC will say “not so fast”.
What will happen? I don’t know… but something tells me that Hulu’s head honcho Jason Kilar will be fielding calls from both Jeff Zucker and Peter Chernin all night long as we head into the Summer Games in Beijing.
And sure, I might be getting calls asking me to stop stirring shit up… but until then, it’s worth speculating.
Of course, the most likely outcome is for NBC to simply grant Hulu the content a few days after the coverage has aired on TV and on NBCOlympics.com, but until we get that confirmation… it’s pretty interesting to consider the likely outcome.
Disclaimer: WatchMojo.com provides content to Hulu. Here’s our page. See our previous post tonight: It’s NBC’s Content, No?
I love nothing more than to blast traditional media, the technology bellwethers and the VCs that back them… but sometimes I think the media covering them goes overboard.
Take for example the reaction by some very respected members of the media surrounding NBC’s policies for coverage online for the 2008 Beijing Games. Sure, it is restricted and definitely not as viewer-friendly as viewers would like… but why should everything be given away?
I won’t make too many friends amongst the hippie love crowd… but here’s some wild, crazy, revolutionary thinking for y’all: if NBC is forking over billions to have the rights for the Olympics Games, should it not decide what it can and cannot do with those rights?
So it wants to air content on the Web after it airs on TV… can you blame them? TV is a $75B ad market, the Web is a $20B market as a whole, with video being a $1B market.
Don’t get me wrong: I am all for free, ad-supported content… but I can bet you that had NBC decided to make everything for free, on-demand, in real-time but had the audacity to air pre-rolls, we’d be having a cow over that, too.
No? Don’t lie… This is why the licensing model will give a run to the ad-supported play, not because it’s optimal, but because viewers have been conditioned to avoid video ads, where we’ve yet to even anoint a standard.
I also totally get why they want to restrict video to NBC properties. It’s not what we do at WatchMojo nor is it what many media are doing… but again, there’s an element of scarcity at play here and I think it’s folly to overlook it. Read more on this is “Does the law of diminishing return apply to content is king and ubiquitous distribution?”
Bottom line: no, it’s not what users want… but users want everything for nothing.
What NBC is doing is actually pretty progressive… especially when you consider how restricted things were in 2004 and 2006. What they are allowing in 2008 is net-net a step in the right direction, and this is obviously because the Olympics come every two years (alternating between Summer and Winter) which is an eternity online… just imagine where they might be in 2010 for Vancouver.
But reading some of the reactions online, you would think that NBC is being lambasted for deciding to run the stuff on their websites and on their terms… it’s like “hey man, just put it up on YouTube… and pass the bong”.
Part 2: Will Beijing Come in Between NBC and News Corp. and Cause Rift over Hulu?
The only thing more difficult than achieving success for startups is predicting who will be successful. So much of it comes from decisions people make, and that usually starts at the top with the CEO. Naturally, the traits that make for a good CEO at a startup are very different than what makes for a good CEO of a large corporation, be it publicly-traded or privately-held. But in either case, you have to ask: are high-profile CEOs effective?
Seven years ago, GE CEO Jack Welch resigned, and after what must have been the highest profile succession planning process, Jeffrey Immelt was handed the keys to the car - or, shall I say, plane.
Immelt was one of the three lieutenants who were in the public race, along with Jim McNerney and Robert Nardelli. In a very odd and somewhat shocking twist, Immelt was chosen to replace Welch and McNerney and Nardelli were let go.
The idea was: after the grueling race, McNerney and Nardelli would never recover and report properly to Immelt. Right or wrong, it was one more amazing page from Welch’s playbook, which has been replicated but not quite duplicated (or is it the other way around; you know what I mean).
In all fairness, Immelt took over on September 11 2001. That’s bad timing, to put it mildly. Exasperating matters was the fact that GE was a major jet engine provider and as such the 9/11 attacks affected GE more profoundly due to its exposure to the travel industry. However, like any self-respecting diversified entity, GE was also a supplier of military jet engines… something that - thanks to 9/11 - boomed in the 21st century. In that sense, net-net, you almost have to ask, should GE not have exceeded the market? It has not.
While GE has continued to do well, its stock has languished: the stock is down 25% since 2001, causing some to call for Immelt’s head. Immelt has also faced pressure from some to spin off NBC, which he merged with Vivendi’s Universal.
See our video profile on NBC Universal here, and our post on How Much is NBC Universal here.
This past month, CNBC host Maria Bartimoro sat down with Jim McNerney, who now runs Boeing. He had actually left from GE for 3M, but then was lured to Boeing (he had run GE’s jet engine business, if my memory serves me right). Here is an excerpt and intro to her interview:
Boeing (BA) Chairman and CEO Jim McNerney has taken his share of hits lately. The ambitious 787 Dreamliner is about 15 months behind schedule, and in late March, Boeing lost out on a multibillion-dollar contract to build a fleet of refueling tankers for the U.S. Air Force. That deal, which is being protested, went to Northrop Grumman (NOC) and partner EADS (EADS), the European consortium that builds the Airbus and is Boeing’s archrival.
Boeing’s stumbles have caught many by surprise, primarily because McNerney, a disciple of former GE CEO Jack Welch, is held in such high regard. After a stellar 19-year career at GE, McNerney became chairman and CEO of 3M, moving to Boeing as chairman and CEO in 2005. I talked with McNerney on May 22 in Chicago at a conference on competitiveness sponsored by the Commerce Dept.
The good news ends there, with McNerney’s past. Sure, Boeing could not have predicted the slowing economy and rising oil prices, but its failure to deliver the Dreamliner in time will serve as McNerney’s achilles heel, in the end.
What about Nardelli? Home Depot lured Bob Nardelli immediately. To put things mildly, that was an even bigger disaster.
The former GE lieutenant basically bombed the company after earning a payout of $210M to leave on top of $170M in salary since 2001. When he left, the story ran as follows:
Home Depot Inc. Chief Executive Officer Robert Nardelli, under fire from investors for earning $225 million while the company’s stock languished, resigned “by mutual agreement,” the world’s largest home-improvement retailer said.Nardelli, 58, will receive $210 million in severance payments, the company said.
Home Depot has lost market share to Lowe’s Cos. during Nardelli’s six-year tenure, its shares have declined 7.9 percent and the company is headed for its smallest annual gain in profit in at least nine years.
“Ultimately the board felt the negativity associated with Nardelli was an impediment to his and the company’s success,” said Daniel Popowics, an analyst with Fifth Third Asset Management.
Nardelli, who joined Home Depot from General Electric, became a lightning rod for critics of excessive executive pay. Nardelli was the only board member to appear at the company’s annual meeting last year, where the size of his pay package was questioned.
“I know he’s been under pressure and that there’ve been dissidents in there,” said Marvin Roffman, of Roffman Miller Associates in Philadelphia, which owns Home Depot shares among $410 million in assets. “There had to be some kind of problem with the board.”
Nardelli left Home Depot and now runs privately held Chrysler, whom private equity firm Cerberus bought off the hands of Daimler Chrysler, ending that disastrous merger. Chrysler is set to lose $1.6B. To his credit:
A source inside Cerberus says that Nardelli will receive only $1 a year in base salary. This person would not go into detail regarding the rest of Nardelli’s pay package, and would only add that Nardelli’s pay will be directly tied to the success of Chrysler’s turnaround…
With all due respect to Jeffrey Immelt, he has not fared better.
GE’s stock price in October 2001: $40. GE’s stock price in 2008: $30. For a company worth $300B, everything else is irrelevant, after all. But compared to Nardelli and McNerney, Immelt has been a smashing success, I presume.
This all begs the question: were these men’s track records their downfall? They all came into their new positions with what can only be described as extremely high expectations…
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