The Misplaced Bet on UGC
Back in 2006, we’d get the occasional call from someone pitching us a turnkey solution to add User-Generated Content (UGC) videos to our WatchMojo.com property, which houses professionally produced videos we have created.
At the time, I thought it was an odd pitch, akin to adding a half liter of malt liquor over graciously aged scotch. Biased no doubt as the producer of these clips on WatchMojo.com, I tempered my prejudice and disdain for UGC and said, maybe, just maybe, UGC is the great next big thing, and advertisers will catch on.
Mind you, having served for 6 years as a VP of ad sales at a Fox Interactive Media-acquired property, it struck me as odd. The advertising ecosystem has long been a tiered on involving marketers, publishers and users. That was not to change in my opinion.
That part regarding advertising is key, for in this free, ad-supported ecosystem we’ve created online, no self-respecting consumer pays for anything; advertisers are supposed to foot the bill for both content and technology.
2008: The Flight to Quality
Fast forward to 2008, and things they have changed. For one, no one calls us with such offers, in fact, the calls are coming in asking for the right to license and syndicate our library of professionally produced, premium content.
While this is refreshing to hear for us, I do believe that it spells a potentially doomsday scenario for many of the aggregators of video content as well as suppliers of the broader video space, namely hosting companies and content delivery network (CDN) firms.
UGC’s Impact on Media, Publishing, Marketing and Advertising
Numerous companies raised a lot of money betting on UGC, expecting the so-called wisdom of the crowds to change the rules of engagement in media. Indeed, social media (of which UGC is a subset) has changed the dynamics of publishing, but advertising will remain largely immune as marketers won’t come near it. In fact, the only real impact UGC shall have on advertising is depress advertising rates as an influx of ad inventory floods the marketplace.However, a solid 5 years into the UGC video “revolution”, it’s clear that advertisers are not impressed. eMarketer just reduced the forecasts for social advertising: The company is projecting that by 2011, advertisers will spend $4.3B worldwide on social networks; it had previously guessed the number would be $4.7B. It also took down its US 2008 estimate to $1.4B from $1.8B. You won’t see that in any investor decks, I’ll tell you that.
This spells a lights-out scenario for many in the space, let’s consider the domino steps to explain why.
Today Chad Hurley, co-founder of YouTube, suggested that affiliate marketing (the low paying, low hanging fruit in the marketing ecosystem) might become a source of revenue for YouTube. This year, analysts have been throwing darts at the board trying to guesstimate YouTube’s earning power. As a professional content provider to YouTube, I can probably add my own two cents, but in this post, that makes no sense… and with an NDA in place, that would be folly. So as usual I will keep the comments to the market as a whole. To read our 2006-era estimate of YouTube’s earning power, potentially the first one conducted on YouTube, click here.
The point is: apart from YouTube’s massive, outlier $1.65B sale to Google, every single YouTube competitor in the social networking file sharing video segment has been throwing airballs and putting up donuts on the scoreboard that matters most: making money, either via income or via capital gain. It seems, in fact, that the only time money is even an issue or in the news is when one of these firms raises a ridiculously high financing amount. As I like to say, success should be measured by return on invested capital, and not invested capital.
Measured by the former, practically all of these firms are flamboyant flops. Measured by the latter, granted, they’re smashing successes.
What Should These Sites Have Done?
In essence, VCs have financed these UGC sites to spend money on hosting. Oftentimes, these hosting firms are engaged in price wars with other hosting firms (or CDN companies) that the same or other VCs have invested in. Then, these companies go public and they flop. Case in point: Limelight Networks, who has put up a disastrous return since its IPO. Limelight raised $130M from Goldman Sachs before its IPO.
Quality vs. Quantity: Are You Better Off?
Well, first off, remember that while social media/UGC is a numbers game where you hope to generate 1 billion impressions; and then sell those for $0.10 CPM. The math is simple: 1B impressions x $0.10 CPM equals $100,000.
With professional content, you can build a lucrative business on 10M impressions and then sell those for $10 CPM, which once again running the numbers yields a revenue of $100,000. This was further discussed in our Hulu vs. YouTube: Quality vs. Quantity post.
As a business person, I much rather take my chances building the business that needs to hit 10M impressions.
But, if you are a VC who invested $10M in a CDN or some infrastructure company, you get far more value by investing in a video file sharing site that can house tens of millions of videos and generate 1 billion streams, even if pound-for-pound, those streams are of lower value. This is especialy true if you’ve never sold a single ad deal, and don’t understand the ad business, as most VCs don’t. Of course, it does not help that VCs have a predisposed bias against content businesses, anyway.
As a result, the bulk of video aggregators essentially spend their VC funding on hosting, CDN, etc., and other non-differentiating costs instead of things that could get advertising money in the doors. Advertisers really don’t care where you house your clips and who your CDN provider is, they do however care about the quality of the content.
In other words, instead of footing CDN charges to host crappy UGC videos that are unmonetizable, these companies should have licensed professional content instead.
Chicken, Meet Egg.
As a content producer, I am biased. But the truth is, it’s the other way around. It is not the fact that I am in the content business that I am biased. I have a belief that advertisers seek professional content, so I am in the business of producing high-quality video content.
In the same vein, content owners are now turning their backs on speculative revenue share arrangements and demanding guaranteed money not because they did not initially believe in the idea of revenue sharing, but because the aggregators loaded up their sites with so much crap that they became unmonetizable.
However, had these aggregators taken a portion of their massive funding and licensed professional content and combined that with their burgeoning audiences, they would have been in a very strong position to profit from it.
But don’t take it from me, take a look at Hulu (for more on this, read Mark Cuban’s post). Admittedly, Hulu had a unique advantage what with being owned partially by News Corp. and NBC Universal. Hulu does not need to pay out for content because it leveraged NBC and News Corp.’s content to come out of the gates.
Hulu came to market 2 years after Google bought YouTube. It also came to market years after the YouTube clones had raised boatloads of cash. But when the dust settles, YouTube and MySpace TV will remain standing, along with Hulu. As per all of the others, I suspect one, maybe two will remain in business. The others might cease to operate not because their traffic is stalling, but because they will be perceived as largely untouchable and undesirable to advertisers. There are way too many low-quality UGC clips on those sites for advertisers to care to bother with. Consequently, advertisers will continue to seek a distance between professional and low-quality (or pirated) content. They’ll have no one to blame but themselves, because they got lazy and arrogant about the value of content.
For the record, WatchMojo.com syndicates content to YouTube, MySpace TV, Hulu, Veoh, Daily Motion, Revver, Metacafe. etc. etc. etc. and genuinely wants every single aggretator to succeed, because marginal distribution - while susceptible to diminishing returns, too - is always welcome.
In the end, sure, YouTube will have walked away with a $1.65B payday, but when you consider that since 2006 the online video has garnered $1B in VC investment, suddenly, you wonder if that’s anything to write home about.
Moore’s Law is Meaningless in an Environment Devoid of Revenues
Back in the day, YouTube’s hosting fees were said to be $1M per month (according to a piece by Dan Frommer in Forbes, he is now at SAI). Today it’s rumored to be $1M per day (according to Fortune’s Yi-Wyn Yen).
YouTube commands 75% market share, Veoh (placed #5) has 1%. In other words, Veoh, Daily Motion, Metacafe et al. are not spending $1M per month, let alone a day, but they are spending alot. Veoh has raised $80M in funding, Metacafe and Daily Motion are at $40M each. I presume the companies are now spending $5-10M per year on hosting fees to house User-Generated-Crap.
VCs are no longer indifferent. Initially, VCs were at best ambivalent about hosting costs because when the technologists who programmed these file sharing sites pitched their vision and business model, they presumed that it would replace the historically expensive cost of creating content. They were wrong.
Their business models relied on the wisdom of the masses and collective mojo to create content that advertisers would want. Why pay for content, was the idea, if content would be created on the cheap? That might very well go down as one of the biggest investment flops ever, when you consider the sum of money invested in UGC with no promise or hope of payoff in the near, mid or long term.
Don’t take it from me, take it from existing case studies:
- YouTube - despite a 75% market share - continues to wonder about monetization.
- Revver sold for $5M after raising $13M in VC.
In both cases, the companies bet on the wrong cost structure: hosting of crap over licensing of quality content. YouTube won, others did not. The”others” camp is far more numerous while YouTube remains the lone winner.
So, What’s Around the Corner
Ultimately, my gut says that many of these VCs who 3-5 years ago placed their chips on these horses will grow wary and tired of burning money while Google’s YouTube continues to galvanize market share. Before long, much like the fate reserved for Revver, VCs will cut off the lines of financing; they will have to sell for pennies on the dollar.
It’s not like this is new, either:
- GoFish has changed business models a few times as it looks for something to hang on to.
- Handheld Entertainment / ZVUE is now worth a whopping $6M, it’s changed its name a few times and paid an obscene $25-50M for eBaumsworld.com, something that left many scratching their heads.
But these have been off the radar. The more visible players are entering a period where they will have to raise $10M or more to maintain their lifestyle… I am not sure those content libraries are worth their weight. I am also not sure if an audience that has been conditioned to watch UGC will suddenly embrace professional content, either.
Once this happens, I expect to see a lot of the videos that are fueling the growth in CDN business take a further hit, too (as a whole, this is a bad market to invest too, as it has become a commodity).
Onto the Next Fad
Of course, this is all moot, because VCs are now chasing the next pipe dream: wireless, clean tech, space travel…
But there too expect a meltdown, and look no further than today’s news where Helio sold for a paltry $39M after raising $650M.
From a general entrepreneurial perspective, the lesson is simple: VCs talk a big game about being in it for the long haul, but their definition of the long haul is unique to their attention spans, which rivals that of a 2 year old’s. When you craft a business plan, build a company based on your gut and your understanding of the space. Generally speaking, you as the entrepreneur has the best understanding of the opportunity and market reality, and not your VCs or advisors.
From a video specific perspective: it’s on. Video is no longer about hype and its potential. With TV audiences now averaging a mature 50 years of age, newspapers declining faster than anyone could have predicted, the Web is the future of media and the future is now. A lot of money was placed on the wrong horse, a horse who is wobbly and in decline. The shakeout has started, it won’t hit overnight because some of these companies have money in the bank… but when VCs come knocking, you won’t know what hit you.
Related: Video
- The race for #3 in the online video space is on.
- Comedy video vertical sites getting cluttered.
Related: Social Media
- Connecting the Dots: Why Social Media Fails at Generating Revenue
- Why Social Media and Advertising = Fail
- Dark Cloud, Meet Social Media. Social Media, Meet Dark Cloud
- Social Media Hype Train Continues
- When Will Social Media Get It?
- Why Social Media and Beacon Are Doomed to Fail and What Facebook Should Do
- Social Media Growing Pains
Is it all negative? Nope. In fact, social networking might be better suited for e-Commerce, but the greed muscle clouds people’s judgment and makes them chase ad dollars, by far the more lucrative slice of the pie.
- Facebook, or MySpace’s, Multi-Billion Dollar Business?
- Are Affiliate Sales the Path to Facebook’s Billions?
- Memo to Facebook Sales Team
What do you think, is UGC going to experience a turnaround and experience a renaissance… or is it on its last breath?
Daily Motion is escalating the battle for #3 in their space (after YouTube and MySpace TV).
Online video advertising is growing, quickly.
Online video advertising is where search advertising was in 2000-01: a major part of the web ecosystem desperately looking for a business model.
Unlike search - where traditional media companies failed to invest and even new media companies gave up in favor of portaldom - a lot of companies are vying for online video supremacy. My read on it is that we will never have a Google of video. That’s right, even YouTube - incidentally owned by Google - won’t command the kind of revenue within its segment that Google does. The reason for that is lack of competition and monetization ability. On the former, YouTube has a lot of competition in the monetization race.
Either way, looking at the stats, the numbers are impressive:
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2009 - set in 2004: $657 million | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2009 - set in 2005: $1.5 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2010 - set in 2006: $2.3 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2010 - set in late 2006: $3 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2011 - set in 2007: $4.3 billion | Source.
An estimate of the Worldwide online video ad market for 2011 - set in 2007: $10 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2012 - set in late 2007: $7.1 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2012 - set in early 2008: $6.6 billion (all broadband at $12.2B) | Source.
It’s thus not surprising to see the sheer volume of money that is being invested in the space, here is an incomplete snapshot:
Judging from that, investors better be patient because only YouTube has exited, handsomely, to the tune of $1,650,000,000 (that’s $1.65B, in case you’re wondering). I’d like to remind everyone that more money does not equal more return, but I digress.
It’s worth noting, too, that YouTube raised less money than everyone else in its peer group but I highly doubt anyone in that group will be worth more, ever, than YouTube.
I am personally hoping that WatchMojo.com pulls the same feat in its peer group. I won’t say “jokes aside” because I am not exactly kidding, admitting that yes, indeed, we’ve raised - and spent - less than $5M to build our content and distribution, which is actually bigger than some of our peers. You might notice that I do not call the players in our group competitors because we are the bastard children of the broader video space: everyone is betting heavily on platforms and user-generated content and our category is definitely going against the grain.
Lastly, I think most of these players are pricing themselves out of exits:
- IPOs will be very hard: yes online advertising is growing quickly but I suspect traditional media (that owns rights to the content) will garner a big share of the online video ad pie. In this context, hitting $100M in revenues or more becomes very challenging, especially with the low-quality content most of these sites are trying to monetize.
- M&A becomes nearly impossible because you need to sell for more than you have raised, and judging by Revver’s fate (who raised $12.7M and sold for less than $5M) that becomes quite hard.
It’s a good thing I am no low-expectations mofo… just because we have not raised boatloads of cash (yet anyway) does not mean we’re not gunning for a big payday one day, but realizing that such a day might not materialize tomorrow, I respectfully think a lot of the companies in the broader video space and our content creation space in particular have dug too deep of a hole for themselves.
To each their own.
This is a work in progress, I am adding CMS platforms (Brightcove, Maven, etc.) and CDNs (Limelight, Akamai, etc.) as we speak. If you have more companies and funding amounts, or if I made a typo, leave the correction in the comments or email me at ash@mojosupreme.com.
Nick Carr published a piece titled The internet rewards the lazy and punishes the intrepid. Given Carr’s usual rants, I thought the title was figurative, but it was in fact literal: he’s talking about navigation systems and what not.
But the title led me to think: what ever happened to long term business planning? Are companies ever built to last or are they built to flip? My vantage point is skewed because I work on the Web, where 1 year is an eternity for some and the notion of creating, building and holding a business for 10 years is nearly impossible (”it will be shut down or sold”).
This past weekend, a successful entrepreneur and reader of this blog emailed me to ask if I’d be at FOWA.
FOWA? I thought. A quick search gave me the answer: the Future of Web Apps. And so I clicked on the result and could not help but laugh when I read what was on the agenda. One bullet point was this doozy:
Launch a web app in 40 minutes.
Why would anyone want to build (let alone launch) a web app in 40 minutes? How lazy, impatient and short-sighted have we become to aim for that.
Forget defensibility issues, what about common sense?
After YouTube got acquired by Google for $1.65B a mere two years after the URL was registered, Guba CEO Tom Mcinerney resigned and said: “I think we can all acknowledge that YouTube has won the big prize… Guba is at a crossroads, and we’re deciding whether to look for funding or to sell. I think we’re inclined to sell.” He said other execs might follow his exit as the company figures out its future. “The billion-dollar opportunity has kind of passed,” McInerney said. “(The executives) are bright, and they’re interested in going for the gold.”
This is enormously candid and a reflection of the mindset we seem to operate in, but is that not like saying Geocities won the big prize in social networking and Friendster, MySpace, Facebook, etc., were hatched in vain?
Maybe I’m old-fashioned, but it takes a lot more time than 2 years to build companies, let alone 40 minutes!
Some of the blame, of course, should rest with investors: be it angels or VCs. Time is money and despite a lot of capital looking for bright people and brighter ideas, investors want to focus on what maximizes returns in a short time span. So invariably this mindset trickles down to entrepreneurs, too.
When Guba’s CEO resigned, he said that YouTube had won the game in online video… we said that the times would get harder for second tier sites because Google would not be able to make YouTube even stronger. VC activity in the space slowed down, as exits became less obvious. Today we’re seeing the fragmentation of online video file sharing services: Veoh is moving into one area and Sony becomes the latest to carve a niche:
Sony is trying to edge into Internet videos with a Web site to be introduced today called Crackle that will feature short segments by aspiring filmmakers, many of whom Sony paid for their productions.
Crackle is the latest incarnation of Grouper, a Web site that began as a way for people to share music, photos and videos with friends. It transformed itself into a YouTube clone and was bought last August by Sony Pictures Entertainment for $65 million. At the time, Sony said Grouper would be focused mainly on user-created video, which it hoped would spur the use of its home video equipment.
But this approach had little traction in the market. There was a lot of competition, especially from Google’s YouTube, which has become the center of user-created videos. Moreover, Sony found that advertisers did not find user video very appealing.
So it decided that higher-quality videos would enable it to stand out in the market and attract advertisers as well. “We have been moving away from YouTvand toward higher-quality content,” said Josh Feltzer, the founder of Grouper who is now co-president of Crackle, “by rewarding the aspiring producer versus the person who wants to share a video of a wedding or of someone jumping off a roof.”
We wish Sony well, but having paid $65M for Grouper which is a rounding error for the Japanese-based giant, Sony has a lot of wiggle room. The writing on the wall for smaller, privately held assets is less rosy: Revver too sought to be a place for aspiring filmmakers, even offering to share in the ad revenue it generated.
We’re not sure how much traction Revver had, as manifested by the management shakedown late in 2006, and since YouTube has begun paying its content owners too, I doubt many content owners will find a need to be on Revver, Crackle, etc., because market leaders tend to offer more upside to content owners alone than the sum of laggards do in aggregate. Of course, YouTube does not ask for exclusivity, so there is nothing stopping a content owner to allow both Revver, Crackle and YouTube to host their videos in exchange for content.
But as we can see, the time to invest in platforms and infrastructure is long over, for sure the contest continues, but to win, you need content. That’s the next great area of focus… we at WatchMojo.com sort of saw this coming a year ago and that is why we invested aggressively in building a library of high quality, low cost video clips. We syndicate our content across a plethora of distrubution points… but over time, as we too have to manage our resources, it’s natural to think that the only file sharing sites that will get content are those who yield solid returns: be it in audience or in revenue. Branding doesn’t pay the bills, of course, but it does build brand equity which over time is required to generate advertising revenue on our site. So if you follow that rationale, ultimately the file sharing sites that will be relevant will be those who can generate ad revenue for their content partners.
For services like Grouper/Crackle and YouTube, that are now part of a larger entitry, this gives them an edge in that devoid of such revenues, they can survive and thrive to some extent.
But, I do anticipate a further shakedown for independent and privately held file sharing sites that need to start showing their investors a glimpse of a path to profitablity, let alone an exit strategy.
I hate to say I told you so, so I won’t.
But I will say this, when we wrote that times would not be as lavish for video file sharing sites in the wake of the Youtube/Google deal, we turned out to be right.
Guba, a pioneer in the space said adios to its visionary CEO earlier this month, which is a shame cause the bloke saw the light way back in 1997. There was no real doubt as to why, though it was not stated at the time.
This, of course, came one week after Revver hit the wall and two of Revver’s co-founders heading for the exit signs while the CEO was on vacation (WTF?): we covered this as well and explained why the going would get tougher here.
Today, we read on PaidContent that News.com confirmed what we’ve been saying all along:
“I think [Guba] can acknowledge that YouTube has won the big prize,” [Guba’s former CEO] McInerney said. “Guba is at a crossroads and we’re deciding whether to look for funding or to sell. I think we’re inclined to sell.” McInerney said that members of his executive team are considering whether to step down. The reason, McInerney said, is that Guba stands little chance of striking an acquisition deal as lucrative as YouTube’s.
You know, people laugh at me for wanting to produce video content, because “enabling others to steal and upload content is so the way to go,” said the wisemen to me.
Now many of those wisemen shall find themselves with no pants on when they realize that there’s not much value in being the #2, #3, #5 etc. file sharing platform when most of the content on them is not legit or of low quality and the content holders stand to generate revenue while the file sharing platforms can’t really (many will, but will it be to overcome the massive hosting and bandwidth fees?).
News.com hits it on the nail right here:
The shakeups come at a time when video sharing is supposed to be the hottest segment in digital entertainment, thanks mostly to YouTube’s massive success. But some analysts are skeptical about whether video-sharing companies can make money and question whether advertisers will want their brands associated with content that is sometimes vulgar, violent and boring.
Worst still: I still think many of these companies are great (Revver, Veoh, Guba, etc etc etc.) but the only problem is that a) I cannot tell them apart and b) they’re VC funded and the VC are not exactly patient folks.
Of course, one thing of note in the article is that Guba avoided VC money:
McInerney, 34, said Guba has operated on a profit and that he and Lambrecht have avoided accepting venture capital.
Y’all know about my (not alone probably) Sequoia | Google | YouTube conspiracy, don’t ya?
Happy 2007!
Disclaimer: we actually work with many of the file sharing sites as many like to feature our content from WatchMojo.com, the Web TV company that - get this - actually creates content.
PLAY
