The Misplaced Bet on UGC
Back in 2006, we’d get the occasional call from someone pitching us a turnkey solution to add User-Generated Content (UGC) videos to our WatchMojo.com property, which houses professionally produced videos we have created.
At the time, I thought it was an odd pitch, akin to adding a half liter of malt liquor over graciously aged scotch. Biased no doubt as the producer of these clips on WatchMojo.com, I tempered my prejudice and disdain for UGC and said, maybe, just maybe, UGC is the great next big thing, and advertisers will catch on.
Mind you, having served for 6 years as a VP of ad sales at a Fox Interactive Media-acquired property, it struck me as odd. The advertising ecosystem has long been a tiered on involving marketers, publishers and users. That was not to change in my opinion.
That part regarding advertising is key, for in this free, ad-supported ecosystem we’ve created online, no self-respecting consumer pays for anything; advertisers are supposed to foot the bill for both content and technology.
2008: The Flight to Quality
Fast forward to 2008, and things they have changed. For one, no one calls us with such offers, in fact, the calls are coming in asking for the right to license and syndicate our library of professionally produced, premium content.
While this is refreshing to hear for us, I do believe that it spells a potentially doomsday scenario for many of the aggregators of video content as well as suppliers of the broader video space, namely hosting companies and content delivery network (CDN) firms.
UGC’s Impact on Media, Publishing, Marketing and Advertising
Numerous companies raised a lot of money betting on UGC, expecting the so-called wisdom of the crowds to change the rules of engagement in media. Indeed, social media (of which UGC is a subset) has changed the dynamics of publishing, but advertising will remain largely immune as marketers won’t come near it. In fact, the only real impact UGC shall have on advertising is depress advertising rates as an influx of ad inventory floods the marketplace.However, a solid 5 years into the UGC video “revolution”, it’s clear that advertisers are not impressed. eMarketer just reduced the forecasts for social advertising: The company is projecting that by 2011, advertisers will spend $4.3B worldwide on social networks; it had previously guessed the number would be $4.7B. It also took down its US 2008 estimate to $1.4B from $1.8B. You won’t see that in any investor decks, I’ll tell you that.
This spells a lights-out scenario for many in the space, let’s consider the domino steps to explain why.
Today Chad Hurley, co-founder of YouTube, suggested that affiliate marketing (the low paying, low hanging fruit in the marketing ecosystem) might become a source of revenue for YouTube. This year, analysts have been throwing darts at the board trying to guesstimate YouTube’s earning power. As a professional content provider to YouTube, I can probably add my own two cents, but in this post, that makes no sense… and with an NDA in place, that would be folly. So as usual I will keep the comments to the market as a whole. To read our 2006-era estimate of YouTube’s earning power, potentially the first one conducted on YouTube, click here.
The point is: apart from YouTube’s massive, outlier $1.65B sale to Google, every single YouTube competitor in the social networking file sharing video segment has been throwing airballs and putting up donuts on the scoreboard that matters most: making money, either via income or via capital gain. It seems, in fact, that the only time money is even an issue or in the news is when one of these firms raises a ridiculously high financing amount. As I like to say, success should be measured by return on invested capital, and not invested capital.
Measured by the former, practically all of these firms are flamboyant flops. Measured by the latter, granted, they’re smashing successes.
What Should These Sites Have Done?
In essence, VCs have financed these UGC sites to spend money on hosting. Oftentimes, these hosting firms are engaged in price wars with other hosting firms (or CDN companies) that the same or other VCs have invested in. Then, these companies go public and they flop. Case in point: Limelight Networks, who has put up a disastrous return since its IPO. Limelight raised $130M from Goldman Sachs before its IPO.
Quality vs. Quantity: Are You Better Off?
Well, first off, remember that while social media/UGC is a numbers game where you hope to generate 1 billion impressions; and then sell those for $0.10 CPM. The math is simple: 1B impressions x $0.10 CPM equals $100,000.
With professional content, you can build a lucrative business on 10M impressions and then sell those for $10 CPM, which once again running the numbers yields a revenue of $100,000. This was further discussed in our Hulu vs. YouTube: Quality vs. Quantity post.
As a business person, I much rather take my chances building the business that needs to hit 10M impressions.
But, if you are a VC who invested $10M in a CDN or some infrastructure company, you get far more value by investing in a video file sharing site that can house tens of millions of videos and generate 1 billion streams, even if pound-for-pound, those streams are of lower value. This is especialy true if you’ve never sold a single ad deal, and don’t understand the ad business, as most VCs don’t. Of course, it does not help that VCs have a predisposed bias against content businesses, anyway.
As a result, the bulk of video aggregators essentially spend their VC funding on hosting, CDN, etc., and other non-differentiating costs instead of things that could get advertising money in the doors. Advertisers really don’t care where you house your clips and who your CDN provider is, they do however care about the quality of the content.
In other words, instead of footing CDN charges to host crappy UGC videos that are unmonetizable, these companies should have licensed professional content instead.
Chicken, Meet Egg.
As a content producer, I am biased. But the truth is, it’s the other way around. It is not the fact that I am in the content business that I am biased. I have a belief that advertisers seek professional content, so I am in the business of producing high-quality video content.
In the same vein, content owners are now turning their backs on speculative revenue share arrangements and demanding guaranteed money not because they did not initially believe in the idea of revenue sharing, but because the aggregators loaded up their sites with so much crap that they became unmonetizable.
However, had these aggregators taken a portion of their massive funding and licensed professional content and combined that with their burgeoning audiences, they would have been in a very strong position to profit from it.
But don’t take it from me, take a look at Hulu (for more on this, read Mark Cuban’s post). Admittedly, Hulu had a unique advantage what with being owned partially by News Corp. and NBC Universal. Hulu does not need to pay out for content because it leveraged NBC and News Corp.’s content to come out of the gates.
Hulu came to market 2 years after Google bought YouTube. It also came to market years after the YouTube clones had raised boatloads of cash. But when the dust settles, YouTube and MySpace TV will remain standing, along with Hulu. As per all of the others, I suspect one, maybe two will remain in business. The others might cease to operate not because their traffic is stalling, but because they will be perceived as largely untouchable and undesirable to advertisers. There are way too many low-quality UGC clips on those sites for advertisers to care to bother with. Consequently, advertisers will continue to seek a distance between professional and low-quality (or pirated) content. They’ll have no one to blame but themselves, because they got lazy and arrogant about the value of content.
For the record, WatchMojo.com syndicates content to YouTube, MySpace TV, Hulu, Veoh, Daily Motion, Revver, Metacafe. etc. etc. etc. and genuinely wants every single aggretator to succeed, because marginal distribution - while susceptible to diminishing returns, too - is always welcome.
In the end, sure, YouTube will have walked away with a $1.65B payday, but when you consider that since 2006 the online video has garnered $1B in VC investment, suddenly, you wonder if that’s anything to write home about.
Moore’s Law is Meaningless in an Environment Devoid of Revenues
Back in the day, YouTube’s hosting fees were said to be $1M per month (according to a piece by Dan Frommer in Forbes, he is now at SAI). Today it’s rumored to be $1M per day (according to Fortune’s Yi-Wyn Yen).
YouTube commands 75% market share, Veoh (placed #5) has 1%. In other words, Veoh, Daily Motion, Metacafe et al. are not spending $1M per month, let alone a day, but they are spending alot. Veoh has raised $80M in funding, Metacafe and Daily Motion are at $40M each. I presume the companies are now spending $5-10M per year on hosting fees to house User-Generated-Crap.
VCs are no longer indifferent. Initially, VCs were at best ambivalent about hosting costs because when the technologists who programmed these file sharing sites pitched their vision and business model, they presumed that it would replace the historically expensive cost of creating content. They were wrong.
Their business models relied on the wisdom of the masses and collective mojo to create content that advertisers would want. Why pay for content, was the idea, if content would be created on the cheap? That might very well go down as one of the biggest investment flops ever, when you consider the sum of money invested in UGC with no promise or hope of payoff in the near, mid or long term.
Don’t take it from me, take it from existing case studies:
- YouTube - despite a 75% market share - continues to wonder about monetization.
- Revver sold for $5M after raising $13M in VC.
In both cases, the companies bet on the wrong cost structure: hosting of crap over licensing of quality content. YouTube won, others did not. The”others” camp is far more numerous while YouTube remains the lone winner.
So, What’s Around the Corner
Ultimately, my gut says that many of these VCs who 3-5 years ago placed their chips on these horses will grow wary and tired of burning money while Google’s YouTube continues to galvanize market share. Before long, much like the fate reserved for Revver, VCs will cut off the lines of financing; they will have to sell for pennies on the dollar.
It’s not like this is new, either:
- GoFish has changed business models a few times as it looks for something to hang on to.
- Handheld Entertainment / ZVUE is now worth a whopping $6M, it’s changed its name a few times and paid an obscene $25-50M for eBaumsworld.com, something that left many scratching their heads.
But these have been off the radar. The more visible players are entering a period where they will have to raise $10M or more to maintain their lifestyle… I am not sure those content libraries are worth their weight. I am also not sure if an audience that has been conditioned to watch UGC will suddenly embrace professional content, either.
Once this happens, I expect to see a lot of the videos that are fueling the growth in CDN business take a further hit, too (as a whole, this is a bad market to invest too, as it has become a commodity).
Onto the Next Fad
Of course, this is all moot, because VCs are now chasing the next pipe dream: wireless, clean tech, space travel…
But there too expect a meltdown, and look no further than today’s news where Helio sold for a paltry $39M after raising $650M.
From a general entrepreneurial perspective, the lesson is simple: VCs talk a big game about being in it for the long haul, but their definition of the long haul is unique to their attention spans, which rivals that of a 2 year old’s. When you craft a business plan, build a company based on your gut and your understanding of the space. Generally speaking, you as the entrepreneur has the best understanding of the opportunity and market reality, and not your VCs or advisors.
From a video specific perspective: it’s on. Video is no longer about hype and its potential. With TV audiences now averaging a mature 50 years of age, newspapers declining faster than anyone could have predicted, the Web is the future of media and the future is now. A lot of money was placed on the wrong horse, a horse who is wobbly and in decline. The shakeout has started, it won’t hit overnight because some of these companies have money in the bank… but when VCs come knocking, you won’t know what hit you.
Related: Video
- The race for #3 in the online video space is on.
- Comedy video vertical sites getting cluttered.
Related: Social Media
- Connecting the Dots: Why Social Media Fails at Generating Revenue
- Why Social Media and Advertising = Fail
- Dark Cloud, Meet Social Media. Social Media, Meet Dark Cloud
- Social Media Hype Train Continues
- When Will Social Media Get It?
- Why Social Media and Beacon Are Doomed to Fail and What Facebook Should Do
- Social Media Growing Pains
Is it all negative? Nope. In fact, social networking might be better suited for e-Commerce, but the greed muscle clouds people’s judgment and makes them chase ad dollars, by far the more lucrative slice of the pie.
- Facebook, or MySpace’s, Multi-Billion Dollar Business?
- Are Affiliate Sales the Path to Facebook’s Billions?
- Memo to Facebook Sales Team
What do you think, is UGC going to experience a turnaround and experience a renaissance… or is it on its last breath?
I never understood why some companies like Handheld Entertainment and Go Fish were publicly traded. With easier access to capital comes the fact that your premature business gets nailed by shareholders, especially if your underlying premise - that distribution trumps content - is faulty.
[Disclaimer: both companies were or are distribution partners of WatchMojo.com]
GoFish is now worth $10.61M, ZVUE (formerly known as Handheld Entertainment) is worth $10.16M. Revver, never publicly traded but armed with $13M in VC money sold for less than $5M to Live Universe, Brad Greenspan’s company.
WatchMojo.com is worth more than those three companies combined, not because any stock ticker or term sheet says so, but because if value is ultimately derived by demand and supply, there’s no competition. It’s not even close. With every passing day, the value of content soars whereas distribution fizzles unless you are # 1 or # 2.
GoFish has changed models and is no longer a UGC platform, but rather, a kids’ ad network. Two years ago, UGC was in; last year, it was ad networks. Something tells me GoFish might very well prevail, but it’s hard to focus and execute when your stock price is out there for public consumption and rejection.
ZVUE went on a shopping spree and financed itself via private investments in public equities (PIPEs), which is always a dangerous tool. Maybe that is why the company’s stock is languishing. I thought of buying some shares but there remains downside risk, even though the stock has fallen from $7 to $0.40.
Not a day goes by where you don’t hear about a new roll up fund. Today Austin Ventures launched one, backing former Razorfish CEO Jeffrey Dachis.
For the past few months, I’ve talked to two investment groups about doing a video rollup and the names of such companies always come up as would-be targets. I’m not sure the upside is there, even at distressed prices.
Last year Ross Levinsohn and Jon Miller contemplated doing the roll-up, but the numbers did not add up, partially because online video is very nascent. So Messers Levinsohn and Miller instead merged with ComVentures and began to invest in online video startups.
This year, when Revver was on the auction block, I considered making a run for it, but I could see that there were and would be dozens more of such companies for sale as the market weeded out the second tier aggregation/distribution sites.
The temptation was there, but ultimately I stuck to my guns: I much rather own content instead of distribution. This is counter-intuitive to the Valley mindset but not to big media. Distribution is great, but it’s not exclusive or defensible per se in online media.
Even in traditional media, look at what is happening to ABC, CBS or NBC (even FOX). They lost market share to HBO, MTV, ESPN etc.
Then enter new media where everything is a click away.
Especially online, distribution is a commodity, and ZVUE and GoFish were commodities to shareholders. The public market is more correct in recognizing that than private investors, many of whom who suffer from herd mentality and are a bit, shall we say, behind the times.
Consider recent history:
Lycos, Excite et al. all had massive distribution at one point, now they’re distant runner-ups. Even Yahoo! is seeing erosion in market share to the new wave of distribution outlets, namely vertical publishers and massive social networking sites.
So instead of owning distribution, we at WatchMojo.com instead partner with them: YouTube, Hulu, MySpace TV, Veoh, etc., why compete with these massively funded strong brands when we can tap into their networks and build our business on their platforms?
I think with time and experience, even private investors get this: this morning Web 2.0 uber investor Fred Wilson conceded content might be a better bet than aggregation. That sure sounds like something I’ve been saying for some time. I doubt Fred is giving content businesses a consideration, I surmise nothing will change that… however, online, where everything is a click away, you cannot build defensible positions in distribution or aggregation, but you can with content.
Daily Motion is escalating the battle for #3 in their space (after YouTube and MySpace TV).
Online video advertising is growing, quickly.
Online video advertising is where search advertising was in 2000-01: a major part of the web ecosystem desperately looking for a business model.
Unlike search - where traditional media companies failed to invest and even new media companies gave up in favor of portaldom - a lot of companies are vying for online video supremacy. My read on it is that we will never have a Google of video. That’s right, even YouTube - incidentally owned by Google - won’t command the kind of revenue within its segment that Google does. The reason for that is lack of competition and monetization ability. On the former, YouTube has a lot of competition in the monetization race.
Either way, looking at the stats, the numbers are impressive:
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2009 - set in 2004: $657 million | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2009 - set in 2005: $1.5 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2010 - set in 2006: $2.3 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2010 - set in late 2006: $3 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2011 - set in 2007: $4.3 billion | Source.
An estimate of the Worldwide online video ad market for 2011 - set in 2007: $10 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2012 - set in late 2007: $7.1 billion | Source.
An estimate of the US online video ad market for 2012 - set in early 2008: $6.6 billion (all broadband at $12.2B) | Source.
It’s thus not surprising to see the sheer volume of money that is being invested in the space, here is an incomplete snapshot:
Judging from that, investors better be patient because only YouTube has exited, handsomely, to the tune of $1,650,000,000 (that’s $1.65B, in case you’re wondering). I’d like to remind everyone that more money does not equal more return, but I digress.
It’s worth noting, too, that YouTube raised less money than everyone else in its peer group but I highly doubt anyone in that group will be worth more, ever, than YouTube.
I am personally hoping that WatchMojo.com pulls the same feat in its peer group. I won’t say “jokes aside” because I am not exactly kidding, admitting that yes, indeed, we’ve raised - and spent - less than $5M to build our content and distribution, which is actually bigger than some of our peers. You might notice that I do not call the players in our group competitors because we are the bastard children of the broader video space: everyone is betting heavily on platforms and user-generated content and our category is definitely going against the grain.
Lastly, I think most of these players are pricing themselves out of exits:
- IPOs will be very hard: yes online advertising is growing quickly but I suspect traditional media (that owns rights to the content) will garner a big share of the online video ad pie. In this context, hitting $100M in revenues or more becomes very challenging, especially with the low-quality content most of these sites are trying to monetize.
- M&A becomes nearly impossible because you need to sell for more than you have raised, and judging by Revver’s fate (who raised $12.7M and sold for less than $5M) that becomes quite hard.
It’s a good thing I am no low-expectations mofo… just because we have not raised boatloads of cash (yet anyway) does not mean we’re not gunning for a big payday one day, but realizing that such a day might not materialize tomorrow, I respectfully think a lot of the companies in the broader video space and our content creation space in particular have dug too deep of a hole for themselves.
To each their own.
This is a work in progress, I am adding CMS platforms (Brightcove, Maven, etc.) and CDNs (Limelight, Akamai, etc.) as we speak. If you have more companies and funding amounts, or if I made a typo, leave the correction in the comments or email me at ash@mojosupreme.com.
The following is a perpetual-work-in-progress. Once you start to compile a list of mergers and acquisitions, you realize why it’s nearly impossible to have a complete list. We are quite confident that the following is a very good, comprehensive list of the largest, more notable deals… but it is not - and no list will be - fully complete because there are too many countries around the world and too many industries to report (it is highly possible that the Wall Street Journal or Financial Post, for example, has such a list… but it would be thick and unwieldy).
We have included:
- many industries
- have not adjusted for inflation
- mergers (be it all cash, cash/stock, or all stock)
- acquisitions (we have excluded partial acquisitions)
- private equity deals.
It is certainly not complete, send me any ones you think I am missing or industries you want us to add next to ash@mojosupreme.com or leave in the comments.
Trivia:
- In 1981, when DuPont acquired Conoco for $7.8B, it was the biggest deal of all time. But adjusted for inflation, that remains a $20B deal by 2008 standards.
- KKR’s private equity deal for KKR remains the biggest buyout when adjusted for inflation, but in actual dollars it has been long surpassed.
Related on HipMojo.com:
Interesting denouement today connects one of the trailblazing sites in viral media and an ambitious team of executives I’ve had the pleasure to meet. The former is eBaum’s World, no stranger to controversy and criticism; the latter is Handheld Entertainment, a company that’s been around for years and has in the past 12 months moved aggressively away from the handheld device market (whose Zuve player has competitors like Apple, Sandisk and Microsoft) into the online media segment.
[Full disclosure: Handheld Entertainment has in the past approached Mojo Supreme about an acquisition, mainly for our WatchMojo.com web video unit].
Some info on eBaum’s World:
Founded in 1998, eBaum’s World is one of the oldest and most successful user-generated content (UGC) sites in the world, generating approximately $5.2 million in revenue and $1.6 million in net income before income taxes in 2006. During the last 12 months, eBaum’s World served more than 2.5 billion unique page views and video streams, with an average time on site per user visit of more than 10 minutes. As a pioneer of viral video, eBaum’s World has helped shape the UGC market with its loyal following and growing community, becoming one of the world’s largest independent online publishers of humor-related content. The company has relationships with such leading media companies as AOL Video, Facebook, FOX Mobile and others.
Today Handheld decided to acquire eBaum’s World:
Under the terms of the acquisition, which is expected to close later this year, HandHeld will pay $17.5 million for eBaum’s World at closing, including $15.0 million in cash, $5.0 million in common stock, which is subject to a $2.5 million one-year hold-back based on achievement of certain financial targets. In addition, HandHeld may pay earn-outs of up to $32.5 million ($17.5 million in stock and $15.0 million in cash) over three years to the owners of eBaum’s World, dependent on the achievement of certain financial and operational milestones of the purchased business.
To finance the deal:
HandHeld has entered into an agreement to sell $24.0 million of three-year, 7.5% convertible debentures with a fixed conversion price stock at $1.90 per share subject to adjustment. Of the proceeds, $15.0 million is for the acquisition of eBaum’s World and $9.0 million is for future mergers and acquisitions, working capital and fees. Other significant terms of the notes include:
- 3.0 million warrants with an exercise price of $1.90 and 2.7 million warrants with an exercise price of $2.09;
- Principal and interest on the debentures in either stock or cash, at HandHeld’s option; and
- Customary registration rights and anti-dilution provisions.
Company insiders are expected to provide $1 million of the $24 million financing.
My Two Cents:
In some ways, I understand management’s approach to building a media company. The idea is most web surfers, regardless of language and age look for comedy. The company first sought to ramp up its new media portfolio by scooping up the major properties that pop up on Google’s first page for humor… but, at some points, the laws of diminishing returns kick in, in my humble opinion.
The company’s current market cap at $30M, the stock has hovered as high as $7.78 in the past 52 weeks and now sits near its 52 week low of $1 at $1.30. To finance the deal, in fact shareholders are diluting themselves once again.
Now say what you want about the reality of those economics; from a strategic perspective, as a producer of premium, rights-owned, professional video content at WatchMojo.com, I think the idea of piling up more and more UGC is not wise, long term (and therein lied a philosophical disagreement in talks, basically).
Don’t take it from me, take it from the marketplace.
Yesterday we heard by way of Tech Crunch that GoFish (more disclosure: GoFish is one of the many distribution partners in our syndication network) was having difficulty finding monetizable content on its site. We have 100 or so clips on GoFish’s site (out of a library of 4,000 clips), within weeks and months we’ll have more and more… and I personally think that is the brass ring is in made-for-web video content, not the TV companies’ content, and certainly not UGC. I also think that file sharing destinations are a hit-or-miss, whereas content is destination agnostic, which runs counter to conventional wisdom and the institutional imperative of the VC world where they’ll invest in yet another file sharing site but they view video content as risky.
Of course, not all UGC sites are created equally. eBaum’s World adds a recognizable brand to Handheld’s portfolio, albeit one that carries both goodwill and a stigma with marketers. The site has in the past received many copyright-violating notices from the very same media companies that represent huge advertising budgets. Of course, YouTube showed that violating copyright, even if unintentionally, need not be a bad thing.
It will be very interesting how this one pans out… the deal is expected to close in the next 75 days and is subject to shareholders’ approval. And, as the Bolt/GoFish deal proved, nothing is a done deal, especially in the murky UGC market.
Finally, the deal is for anywhere from $15M to as much as $52.5M… but as YouTube (disclosure #3: YouTube is another one of our many distribution partners, here’s our old account, and our new one) is showing, monetizing content you don’t own the rights to and advertisers are not comfortable with is no obvious task… so for the time being, this one is a $17.5M deal. Then again, eBaum’s CFO is an experienced finance manager, so I presume the targets are attainable…
Oh, and one last disclosure, sitting on my desk is a licensing agreement for our video library from Handheld Entertainment. Yes, it’s a small world.
Read about this deal on NewTeeVee, hesitated to comment for obvious reasons, but it’s an interesting one if you are into M&A. PaidContent is now running the story, too.
PLAY
