It is astounding that eBay forked over $3B for Skype and didn’t actually buy Skype’s underlying technology.
It is amazing that they didn’t realize this and outright criminal that they didn’t get a fully-paid, irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive (exclusive for the purposes of international calling) license.
Om Malik has all of the links you need:
- Skype Founders suggest they still own underlying technology to Skype
- Will Joltid turn eBay’s planned Skype IPO into a nightmare?
- Why eBay Should Accept Skype Founders’ Buyout Offer.
Now this will probably get settled one way or another, and as a non-Skype user, non-eBay shareholder, I don’t really care either way.
But a few points:
- this proves that just because you hire expensive lawyers doesn’t mean anything.
- One more example of upward failing, and to think this woman, Meg Whitman, could have been our Treasury secretary. I am sorry how wonderful Ms. Whitman was, this was done on her watch and it’s just appaling in terms of botched due diligence.
- With all due respect to Skype founders Niklas Zennstrom and Janus Friis, you have to wonder, will anyone ever buy a company from them again? I mean, sure Viacom/CBS and a number of VCs invested in their next venture Joost (hmm… is there such a thing as karma?), but this was before this bit of news was out. Ultimately, I am not sure I would have a lot of comfort and confidence doing a deal with these guys.
From NY Times:
Why were so many people in the technology world wrong about Hulu? It was an idea that seemed like a relic of the worst excesses of the dot-com era: a portal for content run by a joint venture of media companies. Could any venture have more going against it?
The key words are “technology world”. Joost failed because a bunch of technologists (KaZaa, Skype) hired a technology executive (Mike Volpi) and thought that better technology would prevail.
Also, the perception of what happened at Hulu is somewhat different than what actually happened at Hulu, which basically spawned from NBC’s initially ill-fated NBBC venture. I am not sure if Hulu would have succeeded without the lessons and leadership of the NBBC experience. At WatchMojo.com, we worked with NBBC, Hulu and Joost and trust me, Hulu is far and away more impressive when you see how many other ventures in video have failed… but I think chalking it up to content or UI alone is over-simplifying it.
“The biggest lesson - people want to watch great content,” former Joost CEO Mike Volpi.
“The challenge with the online video business is pretty straightforward - most of the economics accrue at this point to the companies that own the content itself and, for the intermediaries, there aren’t any, that I can think of, profitable business models out there. The challenge is that media companies have approached the sector with more of a self-publishing model, meaning the content comes from their websites, as opposed to through aggregators.
“The challenge that Joost had throughout it’s life was that it had virtually no access to exclusive content. Many people will make issue of the choice to go with peer-to-peer or not, to go with a client or not; fundamentally, the issue is the content wasn’t what we needed it to be. That’s probably the biggest lesson - people want to watch great content.”
—Who’s to blame for not having great content?: “You can’t really say that you’d blame anybody for it. Content companies have decided that it’s in their best interests to publish from their own websites. I still believe that consumers generally would like to have that type of content on a good aggregation site, they would still love to have it on Joost, or YouTube or whomever - but, broadly speaking, the media companies have decided that’s not the strategy they’re going to pursue. Everybody acts in their own self-interest.”
Nice to see content is starting to get its due. Read more.
Om Malik has a good piece on Joost and what went wrong. We commented on it as well, we were one of the initial content providers when the service was, well, like hulu, full of buzz and something you wanted to be a part of.
We were being diplomatic in our post, though we outline some of the issues we saw from day 1, but Malik and his team are direct and candid: “Becoming a white-label video provider was what a business did when all other strategies failed.”
Malik hits the nail on its head with the last line: “In the end, however, it all boiled down to a lack of content.”
Bingo.
It’s not just a lack of content, it was a total lack of understanding of content, as well. The one example I used was them asking us to take 1 to 3 minute pieces (formatted perfectly for the Web) and then insist on us editing into longer pieces of programming. We did it because at the time, being on Joost was validation for our content… I always push for our distribution partners to succeed… but sometimes, the company gets in its own way.
Joost will now offer a white-label version of its software and lay off some folks, including CEO Mike Volpi.
We signed a distribution deal with Joost before they launched, we were very proud to be a part of their roster (read more in my post at the time called: Joost what does WatchMojo.com Have in Common with Viacom, CNN, Turner, Sony, CBS, Warner Music Group and the NHL?)
We were equally proud to sign a deal with hulu, who also put our premium content alongside super premium content from traditional media companies.
The difference, however, is that Joost has left a trail of bizarre decisions and mismanagement. I never said anything, because they were a partner, but today’s news shows that bad decisions have an eventual cost, especially in a very competitive and cluttered marketplace.
For more on that, read:
- Online Video Distribution: The Race for #3 is On…(November 23, 2007)
- Online Video Aggregators: The Fight to Avoid Obsolescence is On (April 6th 2009)
The problem is that Joost was dead on arrival, let alone November 2007 (not 2008, 2007 folks!) when I wrote that first article. By the second article (April 2009), I was wondering why Joost was still burning through VC funds?
The problems really ran across the board:
- the only thing Joost had going for itself was the sleek player, but that initially required a download, making it dead on arrival.
- a bigger problem was that its founders had success disrupting traditional industries, not enabling them.
- the biggest problem, was that Joost’s mid-level people did not really seem to get content either. We had short form 1-3 minute clips that they asked us to re-edit into long form content. You know, the kind that online audiences are running away from TV.
- advertising: they secured big name advertisers (due to their pedigree, perhaps) but failed to have any volume… because they failed to have any traction.
- too much money: read News Corp.’s Rupert Murdoch’s bio, in it, he keeps talking about not having enough capital (yes, that Rupert Murdoch), ditto MySpace. Over time, more money doesn’t prove to do anything but create more problems.
All to say, this reinforces the main theme: financiers don’t know anything about the video industry online, which remains a media and not technology space.
And in a related story, Skype’s co-founders Niklas Zennstrom and Janus Friis, who sold the VOIP pioneer to eBay for $2.4B - $4.1B (time of purchase - final) are in talks to re-acquire Skype from eBay.
Oh, the two launched Joost, which has probably not matched the hype with which it launched.
In as much as Skype was a classic text book case of how to scale a web startup (come to think of it, I am shocked I didn’t put it in our Top 13 Explosive Web Startups of All Time), Joost makes the list of everything that can go wrong with a startup.
However, the fact that the two are publicly seeking to buy back Skype says as much about Joost as it does about Skype. One has to wonder, why not go sit on a beach, or invest in other projects via their Atomico fund?
Yes, the title of this post is meant as a joke.
Our friends at Joost took a major step forward: GigaOm broke the news today. I’ve know about this for a few months, but naturally could not comment much. Man it’s hard to be a CEO blogger sometimes.
As a distribution partner of Joost, we have a lot of content on the service and having gotten a sneak peek at the social media bells and whistles I think this will push them ahead… a bit. In all fairness, the company - armed with a massive $45M and rumored to have raised even more this year - did lose a whole year in the market… in that time span, Hulu - armed with $100M and News Corp. and NBC’s content libraries - managed to crack the Top 10.
According to eMarketer, the size of online advertising revenue is $1.35B in 2008.
Since launching WatchMojo.com in 2006, I’ve had some questions about that figure… so here goes:
Definition of Online Advertising Revenue is Unclear
I’d be interested to know what falls into the category: if it’s only video pre-rolls, post-rolls or mid-rolls, then we leave out companion display ads… which on a site like YouTube account for the vast majority of revenue. Moreover, accounting departments need to standardize this definition. Conclusion on this item, we need transparency and clarity in Accounting definitions and guidelines, I’d be curious to see if an eMarketer spokesperson can address this.
Rich Media vs. Video Ads
When I was running sales for a mid-sized publisher, I recall that rich media ads (Unicast, Eyeblaster, Eyewonder, etc.) were bundled in with video ads because many rich media ads contained video… is this still true? I am not sure. Why?
Because…
In-banner vs. In-stream
Video ads can be in-stream or in-banner. In the latter case, it would be a video ad in a 300×250 that is rich media, YHOO has loads of these; then there are in-stream video ads, which go before, during or after video content. MSNBC has oodles of these. This is a very important nuance.
Double counting for partnerships?
Say FOX Sports has a partnership with MSN, who books that revenue? This kind of stuff is fairly standard, think of all ad repping firms who collect and remit ad revenue… but in MSN’s case, for example, it also has a partnership with NBC Universal on MSNBC.com. It’s somewhat useful to know how that is all booked. Is it case by case or is there an accounting rule that is actually respected industry-wide?
Ad Networks
Say an ad network such as Tremor Media, Brightroll, Video Egg, Broadband Enterprises etc. place some of these ads, they need to be accounted somewhere. The questions is: where are they accounted? My take is that like it was with display ads’ networks, video networks will touch 15% of the video pie.
Here’s our breakdown:
Using the figure from eMarketer for total US online video advertising revenues at $1.35B, up from $750M in 2007, as a benchmark.
- Yahoo.com = $200M
Yahoo did over $7B in total sales… with over $5B coming from ad revenues. Yahoo! has a lot of video content along with plenty of rich media on its site. As the world’s largest property, I could easily see Yahoo! doing even $250M in video-derived ad revenue, but when you consider that video accounts for less than 5% of the online video advertising pie, then we will assign a 4% share to online video for Yahoo! total ad revenues.
- Viacom = $125M
I think Viacom generates a larger than normal share of its online advertising revenues from online video ads. Last year I noticed MTV.com running a good dosage of video ads when my wife was watching The Hills on their site (I swear she was watching it). I also think that between Nick.com, MTV.com, NeoPets.com, iFilm/Spike, Atom.com and Comedy Central.com, one reason why Viacom is making a big deal about piracy on YouTube is that it sees just how good the online video advertising business can be.
- AOL Time Warner = $120M
Time Warner’s sources of revenue from online video includes AOL.com, TMZ.com, CNN.com, Time.com and many other prominent places. In fact, while TW does have the cable assets, if AOL TWX had more video assets, I think it could generate $200M per year from video, easily.
- News Corp./Fox Interactive Media = $100M
This is seemingly bullish, but note a few things:
Fox Interactive Media did $900M in total revenues… with MySpace.com doing $750M alone. Of that, it’s worth noting that MySpace is #2 behind YouTube, with MySpace TV making a push to get lots of premium content… leveraging News Corp.’s sales team, to boot.
Moreover, between AmericanIdol.com and IGN Entertainment (which includes IGN.com, GameSpy.com, RottenTomatoes and my old stomping grounds AskMen.com), this is actually quite feasible.
(disclosure: WatchMojo.com is a content partner to MySpace TV)
- NBC Universal = $100M
When it is not hosting the Olympics, literally, I think NBC Universal does about $75M from online video, when you consider that NBC’s online portfolio includes its namesake assets including NBC.com, MSNBC.com and the recently launched NBCSports.com. However, bear in mind, NBC also owns iVillage and Healthology, both sites that use a decent amount of video, and thus, generate online video ads. I think one reason why eMarketer pumped up its estimate to $1.35B is precisely because of the Summer Games in Beijing, which should generate loads of revenues for NBC and parent GE, I would put the 2008 take to $100M.
- MSN.com = $100M
Depending on the accounting, MSN.com can be making anywhere from $100-250M… but seeing how NBC and Microsoft remain 50-50 partners in MSNBC.com, but Microsoft has reduced its stake in the television network to 18%, I suspect most of the accounting revenue falls to NBC, who then remits a cut to Microsoft’s MSN unit (I could be wrong on this). Anyway, between MSN.com and MSN’s video assets, I think MSN does $100M in annual revenues from video advertising.
- Disney = $100M.
Disney consists of ESPN.com, Disney.com and ABC.com. That is a lot of video inventory.
Moreover, Disney is actually quite the king of online media. Well, at least it was, before News Corp. and CBS spent $2B in 2 years to accelerate their efforts. But the bulk of Disney’s $1B+ digital sales come from ticket sales at its themed parks, as well as merchandising… however, you know online advertising figures prominently, and video advertising growing quickly.
I had done an analysis previously, with Disney’s range coming in at a monthly low of $1M to a high of $7M.
Is it right? Who knows… Do I look like Nostradamus? Unless you have a better idea, let’s assume the math makes sense… however, given a few factors, I now put Disney on the higher range, and give them an annual revenue from video advertising of $100M.
- Hulu = $75M
Using AlleyInsider’s range of $45-90M in revenues, we’ll peg Hulu’s revenues at $75M this year in revenues. Hulu is now a top 10 video site, according to both Nielsen and comScore.
Disclosure: Hulu is a distribution partner of WatchMojo.com, as well.
- Google/YouTube = $65M
The bulk of that $200M comes from display banners. The only part I would attribute to “video advertising” is the sum of revenues from promotional/commercial videos that YouTube runs off its main page. At an run rate of $65M per annum, that is $175,000 per day, times 365 days. It comes from Forbes’ analysis. I should state, all the way back in 2006, one month before Google bought YouTube, I said “YouTube should be making $15M per month, or $180M per annum”. No comment. Disclosure: WatchMojo.com is a content partner to YouTube.
- CBS = $60M
CBS made $24M from March Madness… mainly from banners etc., but some videos, too. And CBS has been growing very rapidly, of late, launching its syndication network. I am not sure if CBS was doing much more than $5M per month on video ads because its reach was largely on third party sites that consisted of the Syndication Network, and let’s face it, once you embed ads, no one embeds your content on third party sites…
So if CBS was doing more than $60M in online video advertising in 2008, then more props to Quincy Smith and his team.
CBS only recently cracked the Top 10 list of largest web properties, thanks to its acquisition of CNET, which takes us to:
- CNET = $40M
CNET probably does $40M in video advertising, which out of a revenue of $400M is 10% of its total. Considering that on your average site online video accounts for less than 5% but CNET was an early mover here, I think that sounds about right… and yes, I am guessing here.
- The clones (Metacafe, DailyMotion, Veoh, Break.com, Joost, etc.): $50M
I use the term clone affectionately, but I suspect that combining all of the players looking at becoming #3 in the online video distribution space would give you a figure north of $25M but less than $50M. Why? Too much UGC content holds them back…
To really avoid double counting, I am omitting all video networks, such as Brightroll, Yume, Tremor, Broadband, etc.
- Rest of Web: $220M
Doing the math means that the rest of the Web is fighting for just under a quarter of a billion dollars.
What do you think? Does this breakdown make sense? Who are we missing?
Everyone is freaking out over the fact that YouTube is trying to monetize but 4% of its massive inventory.
Truth is, I thought that number was lower. But whatever the number, it’s a good thing.
YouTube is much bigger than its competitors. I do not think it’s easy for an outsider to realize just how much bigger YouTube is than Veoh, Daily Motion, Revver, Metacafe, etc.
We syndicate clips to a lot of places, and trust me, relative to its peers, YouTube is eons larger. We also syndicate clips to MySpace TV. MySpace is unique, in that MySpace.com is gargantuan, so if and when a clip gets a push off MySpace TV, it can spike your traffic.
Anyway, we love all of our partners… but the point I am making is that YouTube has so much inventory that even if it could sell ads across 100% of its inventory, all that would do in the short term is pummel ad rates because supply for video ads would shoot up but demand won’t change.
The problem is that the TV companies are generating the bulk of online video ad revenues, but they control their content, so you are seeing a bottleneck of video advertising revenue on a few major sites, such as the portals and the traditional media companies (and judging from the list below, the lines blur due to partnerships and joint ventures):
- Yahoo!
- MSFT and NBC’s MSNBC.com,
- Disney’s ESPN.com, ABC.com and Disney.com
- Viacom’s MTV.com, Atom.com, Spike.com, etc.
- News Corp.’s FOX.com, and MySpace TV (despite what the denigrators say, the much vilified MySpace did do $750M of Fox Interactive Media’s $900M in revenue, people)
- Time Warner’s AOL.com, CNN.com and related properties also probably generate meaningful revenues…
- CBS - who until its recent $1.8B acquisition of CNET was out of the Top 10 properties - has embraced a more open distribution strategy, but I suspect that will tilt to a more closed (or balanced) as it owns a larger web audience where it can keep 100% of revenues (this is why, I think, you will see CNET and CBS start to get more serious about web video, something that, well, both companies should be stronger in).
Then, of course, there is market darling Hulu, who reasonably and fairly can do no wrong. Hulu - whom many miss the point about its raison d’etre - can generate revenues off 100% of its inventory, but its inventory will always be relatively small compared to Veoh et al., let alone YouTube.
The problem is these high quality sites already charge an arm and a leg in ad rates for traditional placement (banners, etc.). Then for video, they want you to take out a second mortgage. Technically, new players like YouTube, Veoh, etc., would be ideal places for more cost effective video ads… but with these, the problem is UGC. In this case, UGC stands for User Generated Crap, or User Generated Crime (as in piracy). So net-net, advertisers balk and the entire inventory (or in YouTube’s case, 96%) becomes untouchable.
But here’s the thing, in YouTube’s case, this is a Godsend, anyway:
YouTube commands a 75% market share… maybe more. So even if it can generate revenues off only 4%, well 4% x 75% is still a meaningful chunk of the ad dollars up for grabs. Trust me, Google might refer to the 4% as a problem to get Wall Street off its back, but any self-respecting ad sales man will tell, it’s the inventory, stupid.
I am not saying that ceteris paribus (did we just break out the latin?), YouTube would not prefer more sellable inventory… of course it will… but that is over the mid and long term, when advertisers come on board and embrace online video.
Right now, they just ain’t.
The Misplaced Bet on UGC
Back in 2006, we’d get the occasional call from someone pitching us a turnkey solution to add User-Generated Content (UGC) videos to our WatchMojo.com property, which houses professionally produced videos we have created.
At the time, I thought it was an odd pitch, akin to adding a half liter of malt liquor over graciously aged scotch. Biased no doubt as the producer of these clips on WatchMojo.com, I tempered my prejudice and disdain for UGC and said, maybe, just maybe, UGC is the great next big thing, and advertisers will catch on.
Mind you, having served for 6 years as a VP of ad sales at a Fox Interactive Media-acquired property, it struck me as odd. The advertising ecosystem has long been a tiered on involving marketers, publishers and users. That was not to change in my opinion.
That part regarding advertising is key, for in this free, ad-supported ecosystem we’ve created online, no self-respecting consumer pays for anything; advertisers are supposed to foot the bill for both content and technology.
2008: The Flight to Quality
Fast forward to 2008, and things they have changed. For one, no one calls us with such offers, in fact, the calls are coming in asking for the right to license and syndicate our library of professionally produced, premium content.
While this is refreshing to hear for us, I do believe that it spells a potentially doomsday scenario for many of the aggregators of video content as well as suppliers of the broader video space, namely hosting companies and content delivery network (CDN) firms.
UGC’s Impact on Media, Publishing, Marketing and Advertising
Numerous companies raised a lot of money betting on UGC, expecting the so-called wisdom of the crowds to change the rules of engagement in media. Indeed, social media (of which UGC is a subset) has changed the dynamics of publishing, but advertising will remain largely immune as marketers won’t come near it. In fact, the only real impact UGC shall have on advertising is depress advertising rates as an influx of ad inventory floods the marketplace.However, a solid 5 years into the UGC video “revolution”, it’s clear that advertisers are not impressed. eMarketer just reduced the forecasts for social advertising: The company is projecting that by 2011, advertisers will spend $4.3B worldwide on social networks; it had previously guessed the number would be $4.7B. It also took down its US 2008 estimate to $1.4B from $1.8B. You won’t see that in any investor decks, I’ll tell you that.
This spells a lights-out scenario for many in the space, let’s consider the domino steps to explain why.
Today Chad Hurley, co-founder of YouTube, suggested that affiliate marketing (the low paying, low hanging fruit in the marketing ecosystem) might become a source of revenue for YouTube. This year, analysts have been throwing darts at the board trying to guesstimate YouTube’s earning power. As a professional content provider to YouTube, I can probably add my own two cents, but in this post, that makes no sense… and with an NDA in place, that would be folly. So as usual I will keep the comments to the market as a whole. To read our 2006-era estimate of YouTube’s earning power, potentially the first one conducted on YouTube, click here.
The point is: apart from YouTube’s massive, outlier $1.65B sale to Google, every single YouTube competitor in the social networking file sharing video segment has been throwing airballs and putting up donuts on the scoreboard that matters most: making money, either via income or via capital gain. It seems, in fact, that the only time money is even an issue or in the news is when one of these firms raises a ridiculously high financing amount. As I like to say, success should be measured by return on invested capital, and not invested capital.
Measured by the former, practically all of these firms are flamboyant flops. Measured by the latter, granted, they’re smashing successes.
What Should These Sites Have Done?
In essence, VCs have financed these UGC sites to spend money on hosting. Oftentimes, these hosting firms are engaged in price wars with other hosting firms (or CDN companies) that the same or other VCs have invested in. Then, these companies go public and they flop. Case in point: Limelight Networks, who has put up a disastrous return since its IPO. Limelight raised $130M from Goldman Sachs before its IPO.
Quality vs. Quantity: Are You Better Off?
Well, first off, remember that while social media/UGC is a numbers game where you hope to generate 1 billion impressions; and then sell those for $0.10 CPM. The math is simple: 1B impressions x $0.10 CPM equals $100,000.
With professional content, you can build a lucrative business on 10M impressions and then sell those for $10 CPM, which once again running the numbers yields a revenue of $100,000. This was further discussed in our Hulu vs. YouTube: Quality vs. Quantity post.
As a business person, I much rather take my chances building the business that needs to hit 10M impressions.
But, if you are a VC who invested $10M in a CDN or some infrastructure company, you get far more value by investing in a video file sharing site that can house tens of millions of videos and generate 1 billion streams, even if pound-for-pound, those streams are of lower value. This is especialy true if you’ve never sold a single ad deal, and don’t understand the ad business, as most VCs don’t. Of course, it does not help that VCs have a predisposed bias against content businesses, anyway.
As a result, the bulk of video aggregators essentially spend their VC funding on hosting, CDN, etc., and other non-differentiating costs instead of things that could get advertising money in the doors. Advertisers really don’t care where you house your clips and who your CDN provider is, they do however care about the quality of the content.
In other words, instead of footing CDN charges to host crappy UGC videos that are unmonetizable, these companies should have licensed professional content instead.
Chicken, Meet Egg.
As a content producer, I am biased. But the truth is, it’s the other way around. It is not the fact that I am in the content business that I am biased. I have a belief that advertisers seek professional content, so I am in the business of producing high-quality video content.
In the same vein, content owners are now turning their backs on speculative revenue share arrangements and demanding guaranteed money not because they did not initially believe in the idea of revenue sharing, but because the aggregators loaded up their sites with so much crap that they became unmonetizable.
However, had these aggregators taken a portion of their massive funding and licensed professional content and combined that with their burgeoning audiences, they would have been in a very strong position to profit from it.
But don’t take it from me, take a look at Hulu (for more on this, read Mark Cuban’s post). Admittedly, Hulu had a unique advantage what with being owned partially by News Corp. and NBC Universal. Hulu does not need to pay out for content because it leveraged NBC and News Corp.’s content to come out of the gates.
Hulu came to market 2 years after Google bought YouTube. It also came to market years after the YouTube clones had raised boatloads of cash. But when the dust settles, YouTube and MySpace TV will remain standing, along with Hulu. As per all of the others, I suspect one, maybe two will remain in business. The others might cease to operate not because their traffic is stalling, but because they will be perceived as largely untouchable and undesirable to advertisers. There are way too many low-quality UGC clips on those sites for advertisers to care to bother with. Consequently, advertisers will continue to seek a distance between professional and low-quality (or pirated) content. They’ll have no one to blame but themselves, because they got lazy and arrogant about the value of content.
For the record, WatchMojo.com syndicates content to YouTube, MySpace TV, Hulu, Veoh, Daily Motion, Revver, Metacafe. etc. etc. etc. and genuinely wants every single aggretator to succeed, because marginal distribution - while susceptible to diminishing returns, too - is always welcome.
In the end, sure, YouTube will have walked away with a $1.65B payday, but when you consider that since 2006 the online video has garnered $1B in VC investment, suddenly, you wonder if that’s anything to write home about.
Moore’s Law is Meaningless in an Environment Devoid of Revenues
Back in the day, YouTube’s hosting fees were said to be $1M per month (according to a piece by Dan Frommer in Forbes, he is now at SAI). Today it’s rumored to be $1M per day (according to Fortune’s Yi-Wyn Yen).
YouTube commands 75% market share, Veoh (placed #5) has 1%. In other words, Veoh, Daily Motion, Metacafe et al. are not spending $1M per month, let alone a day, but they are spending alot. Veoh has raised $80M in funding, Metacafe and Daily Motion are at $40M each. I presume the companies are now spending $5-10M per year on hosting fees to house User-Generated-Crap.
VCs are no longer indifferent. Initially, VCs were at best ambivalent about hosting costs because when the technologists who programmed these file sharing sites pitched their vision and business model, they presumed that it would replace the historically expensive cost of creating content. They were wrong.
Their business models relied on the wisdom of the masses and collective mojo to create content that advertisers would want. Why pay for content, was the idea, if content would be created on the cheap? That might very well go down as one of the biggest investment flops ever, when you consider the sum of money invested in UGC with no promise or hope of payoff in the near, mid or long term.
Don’t take it from me, take it from existing case studies:
- YouTube - despite a 75% market share - continues to wonder about monetization.
- Revver sold for $5M after raising $13M in VC.
In both cases, the companies bet on the wrong cost structure: hosting of crap over licensing of quality content. YouTube won, others did not. The”others” camp is far more numerous while YouTube remains the lone winner.
So, What’s Around the Corner
Ultimately, my gut says that many of these VCs who 3-5 years ago placed their chips on these horses will grow wary and tired of burning money while Google’s YouTube continues to galvanize market share. Before long, much like the fate reserved for Revver, VCs will cut off the lines of financing; they will have to sell for pennies on the dollar.
It’s not like this is new, either:
- GoFish has changed business models a few times as it looks for something to hang on to.
- Handheld Entertainment / ZVUE is now worth a whopping $6M, it’s changed its name a few times and paid an obscene $25-50M for eBaumsworld.com, something that left many scratching their heads.
But these have been off the radar. The more visible players are entering a period where they will have to raise $10M or more to maintain their lifestyle… I am not sure those content libraries are worth their weight. I am also not sure if an audience that has been conditioned to watch UGC will suddenly embrace professional content, either.
Once this happens, I expect to see a lot of the videos that are fueling the growth in CDN business take a further hit, too (as a whole, this is a bad market to invest too, as it has become a commodity).
Onto the Next Fad
Of course, this is all moot, because VCs are now chasing the next pipe dream: wireless, clean tech, space travel…
But there too expect a meltdown, and look no further than today’s news where Helio sold for a paltry $39M after raising $650M.
From a general entrepreneurial perspective, the lesson is simple: VCs talk a big game about being in it for the long haul, but their definition of the long haul is unique to their attention spans, which rivals that of a 2 year old’s. When you craft a business plan, build a company based on your gut and your understanding of the space. Generally speaking, you as the entrepreneur has the best understanding of the opportunity and market reality, and not your VCs or advisors.
From a video specific perspective: it’s on. Video is no longer about hype and its potential. With TV audiences now averaging a mature 50 years of age, newspapers declining faster than anyone could have predicted, the Web is the future of media and the future is now. A lot of money was placed on the wrong horse, a horse who is wobbly and in decline. The shakeout has started, it won’t hit overnight because some of these companies have money in the bank… but when VCs come knocking, you won’t know what hit you.
Related: Video
- The race for #3 in the online video space is on.
- Comedy video vertical sites getting cluttered.
Related: Social Media
- Connecting the Dots: Why Social Media Fails at Generating Revenue
- Why Social Media and Advertising = Fail
- Dark Cloud, Meet Social Media. Social Media, Meet Dark Cloud
- Social Media Hype Train Continues
- When Will Social Media Get It?
- Why Social Media and Beacon Are Doomed to Fail and What Facebook Should Do
- Social Media Growing Pains
Is it all negative? Nope. In fact, social networking might be better suited for e-Commerce, but the greed muscle clouds people’s judgment and makes them chase ad dollars, by far the more lucrative slice of the pie.
- Facebook, or MySpace’s, Multi-Billion Dollar Business?
- Are Affiliate Sales the Path to Facebook’s Billions?
- Memo to Facebook Sales Team
What do you think, is UGC going to experience a turnaround and experience a renaissance… or is it on its last breath?
PLAY
