On March 12 2009, AOL replaced Randy Falco with Tim Armstrong, who previously ran Google’s North American sales operations. I attended the Media & Money conference yesterday at the Roosevelt Hotel in Midtown Manhattan and heard Tim talk about AOL’s future and past.
First 100 Days: Strategy vs. Cost Structure
Before even accepting the Chairman and CEO role at AOL, Armstrong got a ton of advice from experts and monday morning QBs alike.
Once he joined, his first 100 days were highlighted with an assessment of the company’s assets and position in the marketplace. He received thousands of employees’ suggestions. Subsequently, Armstrong decided to wipe the slate clean and formulate a new company strategy that fit on a single page.
The Strategy: Content, Ads and Communications
On this one-pager, Armstrong formulated AOL’s three pillars:
1 - Content
2 - Ads
3 - Communications.
AOL Time Warner: 50% of Marriages End in Divorce
Of course, to talk about AOL’s future, one must put the January 2000 merger with Time Warner in context:
AOL/Time Warner will be 55 percent owned by AOL and 45 percent owned by Time Warner. The combination will immediately boast a market capitalization of $350 billion and an annual revenue stream topping $30 billion.
That’s right, buoyed by the Nasdaq’s gains and AOL’s growth in the 1990s, AOL acquired Time Warner.
The Nasdaq peaked in March 2000 at over 5,000 and crashed down to 1,200 by the next year. To be fair, while there were macro-level causes for the result, there were also some unique factors at play.
From a 2009 article in TheDeal:
The new economy was never realized, and neither was AOL’s potential as the driver and distributor of Time Warner’s unmatched inventory of content. Not that AOL Time Warner, which dropped the scarlet letters A-O-L from its corporate name in 2003, didn’t keep trying. The efforts have already added two successive AOL heads — Jon Miller and Randy Falco — to the list of those the original deal beheaded.
It didn’t help that, as an Internet service provider, AOL has never been more than dial-up. That meant the transaction in which it figured so prominently (its shareholders received 55% of the combined entity’s equity) had built-in obsolescence. It also meant, arguably, that the promise misplaced in AOL kept its parent company from pursuing the potential of its much faster and technologically advanced cable-driven ISP, Time Warner Road Runner.
Throughout that decline and the increased obsolescence of dial-up technology, Time Warner’s size relative to AOL grew considerably and the AOL/Time Warner merger cost shareholders billions of dollars and after less than a decade, the powers that be at Time Warner decided that AOL had to go.
As a result, the Time Warner brass needed to sell AOL - the new stock - to institutional investors and few have the presence and track record of Tim Armstrong, Google’s former North American VP.
The Story Starts: Use of Funds is Main Divergent Issue
According to Armstrong, the main driver for the spin-off is how differently AOL and Time Warner would use cash. Oddly enough, while merger was doomed due to culture clashes and bad timing, in theory, the case for the merger is as sound today - on paper - as it was then:
“Together, they represent an unprecedented powerhouse,” said Scott Ehrens, a media analyst with Bear Stearns. “If their mantra is content, this alliance is unbeatable. Now they have this great platform they can cross-fertilize with content and redistribute.”
The problem, of course, is that big “transformative” mergers and acquisitions are transformative in good or bad ways. They can radically help grow a company (look at how much revenue eBay generates from Paypal from example) but they can also kill a company.
Let Bygones be Bygones
If content, ads and communications are the focus of the company, then the company’s objectives are:
Objective # 1 - To Become The Largest Producer of Content Online
Armstrong has talked a lot about AOL being the Time of the 21st century with regards to producing content, lots of it.
It’s worth noting that Time.com’s own Managing Editor Josh Tyrangiel admits that “long form journalism, a staple of magazines like Time, is not working online”. As such, maybe emulating Time too well won’t serve Armstrong either. Of course, time will tell.
”You are seeing more and more talk of content and scaling it.” AOL has hired hundreds of reports and is investing in systems to scale the production and distribution thereof. Armstrong said he wanted to bring “Silicon Valley’s platforms and mentality to content,” and echoing something I’ve been saying for a while, he added that “while there has been a lot of investment into technology, not much investment has been made in content.”
He’s right. But AOL’s not alone in investing in content, though companies are going about it differently.
Should be stated that we at WatchMojo are now one of the biggest supplier of premium video content online. We not only supply the usual suspects (YouTube, Hulu, etc.) but also vertical sites. Who else, do you know of, for example, supplies both business videos to Thomson Reuters and video game content to IGN.com?
As I also like to say, unlike technology, content isn’t a zero sum game, and in fact, as a content entrepreneur and executive, I love seeing more and more focus being put on content.
The heavily-funded startup Demand Media is also into producing hoardes of content. What sets AOL apart from Demand Media is that while Demand is intent to play the SEO/Google Ad Sense text advertisement arbitrate card, AOL’s second objective is to leverage the strong display advertisement business Armstrong inherits from previous executives such as Mike Kelly (who encouraged the Advertising.com deal, which we ranked as one of the best Internet M&A deals of all-time in our 2006 list here), Jon Miller and to some extent Randy Falco.
Objective # 2 - To Become the Biggest Seller of Display Advertising
AOL owns Advertising.com, the largest ad network in the world. Of course, AOL also owns Tacoda, Quigo and a barrage of other ad networks that were bundled and branded Platform A but have now been - shocking I know - separated as well.
The problem with AOL’s strategy under Falco was that it became a strictly quantitative approach to sell reach and networks, whereas advertising - and brand advertising in particular - is a different beast.
What is really shocking about Armstrong is that despite his pedigree at Google (a joint run by a bunch of quants, basically) is just how much he thinks like a media / content / advertising guy, which makes sense given his role and success at Google, but still, it’s refreshing to see.
Web’s phases
If Armstrong is singing the “contest is king” mantra, it’s because history suggests the next boom will be in content. Yes, this is also a theme in my ruminations, as the Web now shifts to an era of consumption of information and entertainment.
He broke down the Web’s phases as such:
1) Access: ISP, portals, search engines, etc.
2) Platforms: Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, etc.
3) Content: speaks for itself.
Across all new distribution platforms (TV, radio, print), over time, it’s content that becomes most valuable.
AOL isn’t merely interested in producing the right type of content, it’s also looking at scaling quality content, building systems and platforms to help content creators.
SMO Replaces SEO?
When asked about social media, Armstrong views it as a great way to distribute content.
I agree, I think in video at least, because search engines do a crappy job of indexing videos, SEO has been replaced to some extent by SMO, or social media optimization (I’ve called this SNO, or social networks optimization, in the past). This has been accentuated by the “deportalization of the Web”.
He touched on Bebo, which he suggests is being repositioned on what it did best: sharing media and entertainment amongst friends.
Display and Video to Outperform Search?
The next $50 billion that shift online probably won’t respect the same ratio between search and display. He’s right, here’s a graph to demonstrate that:
Related: can online video advertising can surpass online search advertising; can online advertising outright surpass television advertising?
It’s no secret that Armstrong is repositioning AOL’s ad network business, suggesting that AOL’s extreme focus on Platform A might have been misguided.
To become the #1 in display banner ads, he added: “Display cannot be about ad networks and reach alone, brand advertising could be done differently, it’s about the ‘brand story’”.
Multi Brand Strategy
AOL has 70 properties, ranging from men’s blog Asylum to Spinner, but AOL sells mainly by audience. As Asylum’s quick ascent has shown, AOL doesn’t merely have the traffic and eyeballs to build large properties, but it has data.
As a VP for men’s lifestyle site AskMen, I worked with both MSN.com and AOL.com in the early 2000s, and one thing that AOL had was a lot of information on user’s interests, click through data and what not. As a result, if it decides to focus on an audience, it can move fast… and efficiently.
Of course, that is theory; in practice, it boils down to execution and having the right content.
“More and more advertisers see themselves as content producers,” continues Armstrong. I agree, but we’re also seeing a more sober stance occasionally when marketers decide to stick to what they do best.
He touched on local and video, too.
Local
“All about living lives better locally”, he stressed. He invested in Patch due to a personal frustration over a lack of information at the local level. AOL acquired Patch, who has since expanded into 30 cities and tends to partner with local media, as is the case in New Jersey.
Video
AOL is producing six times more videos than it was a mere 4-5 months ago. The content can be broken down into two main genres:
- very high quality (Beyonce comes in the studio)
- original videos based on their media properties.
I personally break professional videos into two: super premium and premium. Here is my not-so-complicated view of content online:
- At the top, you have ”super premium” representing Hollywood, studios etc. You can command extremely high CPMs but the inventory is usually low etc.
- In the middle, you have “premium” content, basically being where WatchMojo now has built a nice position. If you’re keeping track, CPMs are healthy and inventory is decent, so the overall revenue is highest here.
- At the bottom, you have UGC, which totally changes the rules of engagement of media, news and publishing, but which will fail in ad-supported model.
Echoing by bearishness on scripted entertainment, Armstrong believes that there is an “opportunity” in scripted entertainment, but can’t take a Hollywood approach online. This is why many companies have failed, in fact, in the video content business.
AOL’s Future
The Verdict is obviously still out. Yesterday’s chat is largely about getting the story right and out, as institutional investors will have to buy into the story and the stock once Time Warner completes the divorce less than a decade after the marriage.
Will the Street buy in? Who knows. After all, the Street applauded the TWX/AOL merger when it happened, and then evaporated 90% of the value of the combined entity.
But I do know that Armstrong is saying all of the right things to position AOL as the home of great content and as a home for content producers. And, if content is king and in the end content prevails, then AOL might prove to be a nice long term bet amongst media stocks.
You can read more about Armstrong’s chat yesterday at the Media & Money conference on Business Insider. You can also read my previous posts on AOL and their content initiatives here:
- Mediaglow: Silver Lining in AOL Empire?
- Did Armstrong Leave Google Because Content is King?
From CNET:
Interviewer and conference organizer John Battelle tried to pry more information out of AOL CEO Tim Armstrong, to little avail. But it sounds like it has something to do with the framework that powers AOL’s network of blogs and content properties.
“It’s a broader platform with more information around content and the creation of content,” he said. “We see that platform evolving to a much higher scale.”
Armstrong, who joined AOL in March after a stint as head of sales at Google, said that recently the company has increased its roster of journalists from 500 to over 3,000, and that over 3,000 pieces of content are posted every day to AOL properties. It’s also now creating three to four times as much video as it was several months ago.
“We’ve hired people from places like The Wall Street Journal and ESPN,” Armstrong said. “You’re not just hiring a person, you’re hiring the community they come with, and I think that has been an important part when you look at the network effects of that.”
I doubt Google’s market capitalization will surpass that of Microsoft’s (as I outlined as a possibility in 2006), but judging by the growth in cash flow of each company, it’s not impossible over time:
Graph via Business Insider.
From AOL’s Tim Armstrong:
Phase 1 of the Internet, during the ’90s, was primarily about access, he said. Then came Phase 2, occurring this decade, which has focused on platforms such as Google and Facebook. The next phase will be about news, entertainment and video all going through those pipes, and benefiting from platforms like Facebook that help consumers find and share information quickly, he said.
Agree. Read more.
Apparently, long form journalism doesn’t work online, according to venerable Time magazine, says Josh Tyrangiel, Managing Editor of TIME.com.
Read more on Beet.tv. Does the same apply to videos?
AOL-owned TMZ is firing its AOL sales staff. But I am not sure if the AOL sales staff was all that comfortable selling TMZ to their advertisers.
Rafat Ali is correct when reading between the lines about the reasons. TMZ’s founding editor Alan Citron (who is now with Buzznet, by the way) summarized the situation as such:
But, this is really over-simplifying it. The main issue would be TMZ’s raciness. No sane advertiser would openly put TMZ on its insertion order. So TMZ actually needs run of network campaigns. Yes, PerezHilton does land the major sponsor here and there, that is enough to support a so-called one-man operation, but PerezHilton and TMZ (both amazing franchises) are different, in that TMZ is part of AOL and at $15M in annual revenues, it is hard to convince enough fortune 500 advertisers or top tier ad agencies to include it on their ad buys.
I faced the same challenge when IGN bought AskMen, we had racy content (relative to IGN), so the IGN sales team - far and away a better machine than I (who was selling AskMen inventory) - would hesitate to pitch us out of fear of scaring the marketers.
Will TMZ fare better as a stand alone company? Not sure.
Interesting times:
At stake is nothing less than the future of television shows and movies on digital platforms at a time when online viewing is exploding, but still remains a minuscule percentage of overall television viewing.
Read more on FT.com:
What Time Warner will now focus on, from NYTimes:
“We’re focusing the company now on its core content businesses — TV and film production, television networks and publishing,” Mr. Bewkes said Thursday at the company’s annual meeting. But in other recent comments, he has not ruled out also selling the company’s magazine arm, Time Inc., one of the world’s largest publishers.
From All Things D, via Business Insider:
Content is king: Armstrong stressed content, which comes from AOL’s MediaGlow content unit, run by Bill Wilson.
Content will be a key focus at AOL, which has been investing heavily in media sites over the last several years.
I’ve been hammering away the content is king mantra for years. With social media and Web 2.0 hype deflated, I think content will truly be king from here on out online.
As per the AOL/Time Warner divorce, I know it’s easy to poop on the idealistic merger than went awfully wrong, but the truth us, the synergies were/are there… this one falls in the category where culture clashes derailed the deal. Once relationships soured - and yes, the market tanked - there was nothing that could get things back on track, even, apparently, the fact that both AOL and Time Warner will focus on content moving forward.
It’s a great time to be in the media - and content - business, but yes, I’m biased.
Some time ago, online media professional Dave Haber (and reader of this blog) emailed me an article from MediaPost, titled “How Can Independent Video Producers Compete In The Super-Premium Era?”
The article was written by Lewis Rothkopf, who is vice president of network development at BrightRoll, one of the pre-roll networks out there. As a side note, I really admire Brightroll’s CEO Tod Sacerdoti. Unlike most of the pre-roll intermediaries who seem to be either in denial or out of touch about that the pre-roll format, Sacerdoti is realistic about the pros and cons of the format, not insulting people’s intelligence about why his firm focuses on the unit.
Anyway, for some time, I was considering writing a related piece on indeed how independent video producers (such as WatchMojo.com, the company where I am the CEO) can compete in the super-premium era. It was the first time I’d seen someone else use those terms, because for some time, we’ve separated “premium content” (what new media producers like WatchMojo.com produce) from “super premium content” (what TV networks and film studios create).
Rothkop’s three tips included:
1) Compete on quality.
2) Compete on price.
3) Compete on advertiser-friendliness.
As proud as I am about WatchMojo.com’s content, I don’t think that economics permit premium content quality to surpass that of super premium. It won’t happen. After all, with text content, a kid in a basement can pass off for a Pulitzer-prize winning journalist. In video, that is pretty darn hard.
So while his ideas are good, I would add that you should also compete on:
4) Rights: giving partnerships the opportunity to go global and multi-platform
5) Frequency: the drawback with traditional media is that it does not really update as frequently as online consumers of media (be it listeners, viewers, readers) are grown accustom to.
I could list a few other things, but the purpose here is not to give away too much of our secret sauce.
The purpose of this article, in fact, is to look at how traditional media companies can avoid the music industry’s fate by understanding how new media companies fit in their strategies and ecosystem.
Tenet 1: The Web Shrinks Traditional Media
Due to the economic meltdown and subseqent slowdown in advertising, a lot of cable companies are regretting putting their shows online for free.
It’s not just the cable companies, though. From Michael Lynton, the CEO of Sony Pictures, via HuffPost:
I actually welcome the Sturm und Drang I’ve stirred, because it gives me an opportunity to make a larger point (one which I also made during that panel discussion, though it was not nearly as viral as the sentence above). And my point is this: the major content businesses of the world and the most talented creators of that content — music, newspapers, movies and books — have all been seriously harmed by the Internet.
Is that true? I think the Web shrinks the traditional media business (producers of super premium content) by giving an enormous opportunity for new media creators like WatchMojo.com (producers of premium content) to disrupt things.
Tenet 2: Amongst Traditional Media, With Online Video: Those Who Can, Won’t. Those Who Want, Can’t
As I’ve long argued: online video can be a salvation to print media, at least they should care about online video. The problem is that print media lacks the DNA - be it in terms of asset or people - whereas TV-centric media firms have the DNA but lack the financial incentive.
Either way for traditional media, it does not look good. Those who can, won’t; those who want, can’t.
Tenet 3: Super Premium Content vs. Premium Content
On the traditional media video company side of things, you have companies who slant towards scripted entertainment, news and sports (CBS, ABC, NBC and FOX) and then the non-fiction ones, such as Discovery Communications, Liberty Media (who owns the Travel Channel), Scripps.
The advertising budgets in television are massive. As such, these companies spend what it takes to produce “super premium content”.
Memo to New Media Guys: Know Your Role
I don’t think new media producers have the budget or financial incentive to create super premium content. Startups who raise tons of venture capital money to do so end up making mistakes because they borrow traditional media’s inefficient and wasteful ways and burn a lot of money early on, before the web video market (be it in the form of ads or subscriptions) materializes.
This is why, I think, you have seen companies like Mania TV shut down. I am not saying they were producing “super premium” content but by attacking the music category, they ended up adopting traditional media’s bad habits.
At WatchMojo.com, we made a counter-intuitive decision to avoid focusing on one niche and produce content across the main verticals: Automotive, Business, Education, Fashion, Film, Food, Health, Music, Politics & Economy, Space, Sports, Technology, Travel, Video Game categories. A lot of accomplished people thought I was crazy to do so, but we are one of the few media companies (traditional of new media) that gets guaranteed, recurring licensing fees. Judging by our revenue breakdown, the bet paid off:
The proof is in the pudding: our content is of high enough quality to merit getting licensing fees, but in the really grand scheme of things, I am not delusional: I don’t pretend that our travel content is going to trump The Travel Channel’s, or that our Science videos will put the Discovery Channel on the brink of collapse, or that our cooking videos will put the kybosh on the Food Network.
Of course, that is not the point. Right now, our content beats 99.9% of the content out there, and the 0.1% that traditional media’s super premium content represents is still only being tested online. I think Discovery’s CEO David Zaslav is 100% right to say:
“I’ve spent a lot of time looking at the economics. If you take out a pen and you add it up, there’s not a lot of economics there [of putting full shows online]. The business model is not that strong…we get substantial value by distributing our content on dual-revenue-stream platforms, domestically and around the world. We’ve been able to take the best of our content and use pieces of it through HowStuffWorks.com or on our other sites..there’s no reason for us to take a fire hose and take a fantastically valuable library and make it available on the Web for free.”
He’s right. The web right now, and potentially never (yes, I am saying never), will grow large enough to become bigger than TV is today. However, I think that TV will shrink enough and online will grow enough for the Web to surpass everything else.
I’ve compiled the experts’ projections and ran the numbers myself, it is highly possible that online video advertising will surpass search ads by 2018 as online ads altogether take over television advertisings by 2021.
Tenet 4: Is The Objective Not Maximizing Value?
If and when that happens, the television business will have shrank by so much and online video companies will have grown so much that the disparity in market value could very well be in the favor of new media players.
Right now, it is a given that Netflix is worth more than Blockbuster. Netflix is worth $2.25 billion; Blockbuster all of $135 million. That’s right. But ten years ago, that seemed impossible and 13 years ago, Netflix didn’t even exist.
Mind you: in 2008, Blockbuster lost $375 million on revenues of $5 billion; Netflix earned $83 million on revenues of $1.3 billion. Ultimately, it’s about each company’s prospects.
Don’t get me wrong, in 10 years, traditional media companies like Walt Disney (parent of ABC and ESPN), CBS, GE’s NBC unit and News Corp.’s FOX division might make more money each year than any new media outfit, but mark my words, some of the new media outfits involved in the production and distribution of premium content (such as our own WatchMojo.com, but also the Revision3’s and Next New Networks and countless others who get less coverage) will be worth more than some of those venerable traditional media brands.
I know, I sound crazy now, delusional. But you judge for yourself:
In all likelihood, there will be an enormous amount of consolidation and an outfit that amalgamates the pieces will be worth a lot. If the traditional media guys get it right, they will outright buy everything in sight now, and leave them alone for a while.
I respect the hell out of the CBS brass, but while they made a prescient bet on acquiring Wallstrip, they dropped the ball in the market meltdown of 2008 by rushing to shut it down. Again, this is not about CBS or Wallstrip per se, it is about the interaction between traditional media and new media content companies as one market shrinks rapidly and the other balloons faster than anything else.
Tenet 5: Actually, TV Can Avoid the Fate of the Music Industry
I came across this graph by Magna Insights via the GrowYourBusiness blog. If we were to extrapolate it to the video business (all filmed entertainment, be it theatrical releases, home entertainment, or television programming), you’d think that television is as doomed as music, but it need not be that way.
Regular readers know that I don’t think anything will “kill” television outright, but this graph does suggest that online video will shrink traditional video, as was the case in music. There is a rationale to support this argument:- if the traditional media companies don’t legally make their content available online, then there is the threat of piracy. Think of music labels.
- if they do publish their content online, then they shrink their businesses via the threat of cannibalization. This is what happened to print companies, the more aggressive ones actually shrunk much quicker than those who weren’t very aggressive (think NYTimes, or the Chronicle).
But, I think it doesn’t have to be this way.
Here’s my thinking:
Music is one-dimensional in every sense of the word: it’s just audio, meaning that despite what the crack-smoking analysts seem to think, advertising-supported music is dead on arrival. For music to generate revenue online, it would require subscriptions, and consumers don’t want to pay. Media companies might pay record labels for the right to distribute music, but record labels want such massive fees that this becomes killer, too. So ultimately, because of music’s limited scope, there is really no viable business model to support it.
This is why music is increasingly seen as promotional fodder to drive merchandising, ticket sales, etc. The artists get it, the labels are adapting to it.
Video content is different. Ad-supported economic models won’t replace offline revenue streams, but they can grow to become material over time. Of course, this isn’t enough to offset the losses in traditional revenue streams, I get it, but in music, the independent artists that used the Web to promote themselves did not generate any revenue for traditional record labels per se, however, in video, new artists can represent new revenue streams for traditional TV and film companies. As such, to illustrate the point, in addition to digital sales off traditional libraries (represented by the purple), there would be additional incremental revenues from new media studios (represented by the green), as I’ve tried to demonstrate in the make-shift graph below:
But the same way that music has become promotional for other, related activities (merchandising, ticket sales), I would argue that if traditional media companies use the promotional card righ, they can actually stop the pace that traditional television is shrinking. Notice I didn’t say reverse it. I don’t think anything will reverse it, but with the web, they can optimize their inefficient production processes:
- You know what will be a hit and won’t be a hit without having to burn tens of millions of dollars in production fees.
- You can advertise your television and theatrical releases online, which is cheaper than offline media.
- etc.
The point is, even if revenues get clipped, costs should fall too. If this is managed right, then the traditional media companies’ can technically preserve their profit margins.
I think it is sheer lunacy to take a $1M production made for TV - where the economics are sound - and put that online and get nothing. But using the examples I outlined above, since audiences are increasingly online, I think there’s an argument to be made for:
- the Travel Channel to partner with us on our travel content;
- for Discovery Channel to partner with us on our science content;
- for the Food Network to partner with us on our food content;
- etc.
Tenet 6: Gobble, or be Gobbled
Eventually, though, I think traditional media companies can use new media companies for much more than just promotional vehicles. In fact, they can use the CBS/Wallstrip example and outright acquire new media ventures and commercialize the new media library while protecting the core value of their offline stuff, which can be showcased online, but not in its entirety.
Does this open the door for some piracy? Sure. But Wolverine was pirated but in the end, it probably helped augment buzz for the movie.
CBS is working now with EQAL, for example. Eventually it might outright buy them. It might not, of course.
Tenet 7: It’s All About the Multiples
Ultimately though, as the traditional media companies become more digital, via
a) the acquisition of new media companies
b) the digitization of some of their traditional assets
c) the convergence between shrinking offline revenues and growing digital revenues
their price-to-sales and price-to-earnings multiples will grow… meaning that the companies can remain very valuable, avoiding Blockbuster’s fate.
Tenet 8: Print Shall Strike Back
Of course, because print media companies lack the DNA to dive fully into video, and because online video is purely incremental, I suspect a lot of the print companies (both newspapers and magazine ones) will put the new media video companies in play on the M&A front.
It is possible that the current wave of managers in print still likes to stay within their comfort zone (behind a typewriter/computer) and not behind a camera, but the economic argument over time will be too great to overlook. To clarify on this point, it is not that I suggest that in 2009, online video revenue can make up for print loss of revenue. Rather, I suggest that print revenue will do dry up in the next decade and online video will so grow that these two will converge, and unlike for TV companies, this revenue will be incremental.
Tenet 9: The Reality Remains the Same, Though
But despite all of this, the reality remains the same: old media is fundamentally inefficient in today’s digital and connected world. Perhaps the carnage of the past 6 months has forced traditional media companies to cut back, but many have not. The NYTimes has a staggeringly large newsroom, its relevance and survival is at risk by leaner new media outfits.
Tenet 10: History Repeats Itself
A decade ago, a lot of savvy media folks didn’t quite recognize the full extent of online media’s risk to print. Today, the writing is on the wall.
Ultimately, if television wants to avoid the fate of music labels, then maybe it can dive in to the history of newspapers.
AOL’s ad revenues fell 20%. That was the past. Personally, I love their Media Glow strategy: creating smaller sites (but still huge) that focus on one demographic, on stand-alone URLs.
For smaller media companies like Gawker, eventually it didn’t make sense to have stand alone web properties (think Valleywag being folded into Gawker.com under valleywag.gawker.com). But for AOL - one of the largest portals around - having everything under AOL.com also doesn’t make sense.
They can still get traffic by bundling the smaller sites under AOL for reporting. But whereas previously the value of advertising real estate tumbled with each level, this way they retain more value.
For example, AOL.com being the main front page would be very valuable. Say they wanted to have a men’s channel under Men.AOL.com, this would be seen as one level lower, and Men.AOL.com/Health (for example) would - while more targeted - be seen as two levels deeper. The deeper you go into a site’s maze, the less advertisers value it.
But by having a site like Asylum.com to reach men, then Asylum becomes both the “frontpage” and a targeted, uniquely branded property, and Asylum.com/Health is both targeted and only one level down.
This might all seem rather technical, but I think that despite today’s 20% meltdown, over time, this strategy will look very smart. Read more on Business Insider.
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